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Abstract 
In 1992 the Taxation Sub-Committee of the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants noted that one of the primary problems facing the taxation of derivatives used 
as hedges was the capital/revenue distinction, due to the fact that the application of well-
established legal principles to these new derivative instruments and investment strategies 
could lead to inequitable results. Notwithstanding recommendations that special rules be 
developed to govern the taxation of derivatives used as hedges, little has changed. 
The South African Revenue Service have stated in their 2014 ‘Tax Guide for Share Owners’ 
that the sale of futures contracts is likely to be on revenue account, even if used as a hedge 
against losses on underlying shares held as capital assets, ostensibly on the basis that such 
assets derive no return for the holder and are therefore only held to be realised at a profit. 
This study seeks to investigate whether or not the sale of a futures contract used as a hedge 
against losses on an underlying share investment, held as a capital asset, should be taxed on 
revenue account or if in fact an argument can be made for the gain realised on the derivative 
to be treated as capital in nature. 
Against a background on the mechanics of traded futures contracts and the adopting of a 
‘short position’, consideration will first be given to existing South African precedent and the 
authority cited by SARS in support of the expressed revenue treatment. Alternative 
arguments proposed by writers, based on the analogous treatment of insurance proceeds or 
the practice of ‘following the underlying asset’, will be considered against both South African 
and international support. This study will then consider the application of common law 
principles of the capital/revenue determination to identify arguments applicable to futures 
hedging. It is submitted that some of these common law principles identified, in particular 
those relating to a taxpayer’s purpose, as compared with his or her intention, would provide 
a cogent argument in this regard. 
The above findings will then be critically evaluated to determine what, on balance, the 
correct tax treatment in the circumstances should be bearing in mind the words of 
Friedman J in ITC 1450 (1988) 51 SATC 70 at 76, and Smalberger JA in CIR v Pick n Pay 
Employee Share Purchase Trust (1992) 54 SATC 271 at 279: 
‘when all is said and done, whatever guidelines one chooses to follow, 
one should not be led to a result in one’s classification of a receipt as 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
In 1992, a report compiled by the Taxation Sub-Committee of the South African Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (‘SAICA’) noted the uncertainty that existed regarding the tax 
treatment of derivatives used as hedges in South Africa.1 
The SAICA report (1992) set out that one of the primary problems facing the taxation of 
derivatives used as hedges in South Africa was the capital/revenue distinction, due to the 
fact that the application of well-established legal principles to these new derivative 
instruments and investment strategies could lead to inequitable results.2 By way of example, 
the SAICA report (1992) refers to the fact that the nil return (in the form of interest or 
dividends) derived in respect of these derivative instruments, the three month short-term 
nature of the holding of the derivative instruments and the daily ‘mark-to-market’ 
settlement requirements (both required by the rules governing the derivatives) are all 
indicative of an asset that is itself ‘revenue’ in nature.3 Similarly the fact that a ‘profit’ is 
anticipated on a hedge if it has been correctly entered into, could mean that the hedge 
should be construed as a ‘scheme of profit-making’ such that all resultant profits were 
revenue in nature.4 
Subsequent to the SAICA report (1992), in July 1994 a Sub-Committee of the Tax Advisory 
Committee (‘TAC’) issued a ‘Consultative Document on the Tax Treatment of Financial 
Arrangements’, in response to the difficulty of taxing modern financial arrangements using 
general tax principles developed prior to their advent. This document suggested that, in the 
context of derivatives hedging: 
‘Special hedging rules for hedging instruments relating to … portfolios 
of assets … appear to be practically difficult to legislate for or 
administer. However it is intended to examine foreign jurisdictions’ 
legislation and practices at a later stage’5 
                                                   
1 South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, Report on the tax treatment of futures and 
options, (23 October 1992), 26. 
2 Ibid at 6. 
3 Ibid at 19-20. 
4 Ibid at 24. 
5 Sub-committee of the Tax Advisory Committee, Consultative Document on the Tax Treatment of 
Financial Arrangements, (20 July 1994), 71. Up until this point, little had been done in this regard. 
See the reference in 1.2 of the SAICA report to page 140 of the report of the Stals Commission of 
2 
Notwithstanding these comments, little has changed in the last 20 years. 
Even though the utilisation of derivatives as hedges is not a new practice amongst taxpayers 
in South Africa, there remains a distinct lack of legislative guidance in the Income Tax Act, 
58 of 1962 (‘the Act’)6 on how to classify gains made on these hedges for tax purposes. The 
Act, for example, only provides for the specific treatment of revenue gains made on foreign 
exchange hedges, in terms of section 24I, and this section does not make provision for 
hedging gains to be capital in nature. 
In their 2017 ‘Tax Guide for Share Owners’ (‘the Share Owners Guide’),7 the South African 
Revenue Service (‘SARS’) states the following in paragraph 3.4.6 under the heading ‘Low or 
nil return’, in the context of general principles to be considered when deciding on a matter 
of capital or revenue interpretation: 
‘The sale of futures contracts is likely to be on revenue account, even if 
used as a hedge against losses on underlying shares held as capital 
assets (ITC 1756; Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes))’ 
The concept of ‘Low or nil return’ refers to a general principle that assets which derive no 
return for the holder (such as dividends or interest) are likely only held in order to be 
realised at a profit, and should accordingly be treated as a giving rise to revenue receipts 
when sold. The statement above is the only guidance given by SARS on the treatment of 
gains made when hedging with derivatives. 
                                                   
Inquiry, where it was commented that ‘the tax authorities could not provide the committee with 
clear guidelines as to how futures and options transactions would be treated for tax purposes in 
the South African context’. 
6 This study takes into account all relevant tax legislative amendments up to and including the 
amendments brought about by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 17 of 2017. All references to 
‘section’ and ‘paragraph’ are to sections of the Act and paragraphs of the Eighth Schedule thereto, 
unless the context indicates otherwise. 
7 This 5th issue dated 16 February 2017, followed on the 1st draft from 2006, the 2nd version from 
2008, the 3rd from 2012 and the 4th dated 17 February 2014. All five versions of this document which 
have been issued however contain the same statements in regards to the revenue nature of futures 
hedging. Whilst the forward for this share owners guide states that ‘[t]his guide provides general 
guidance on the taxation of share owners. It does not go into the precise technical and legal detail 
that is often associated with tax, and should not, therefore, be used as a legal reference. It is not an 
“official publication” as defined in section 1 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 and 
accordingly does not create a practice generally prevailing under section 5 of that Act. It is also not 
a binding general ruling under section 89 of Chapter 7 of the Tax Administration Act’, it is likely 
that the statements made in 3.4.6 are still indicative of the viewpoint which SARS will adopt at the 
outset of any review of a taxpayer’s futures hedging transaction, and therefore warrants the closer 
investigation conducted in this study. 
3 
1.2. Problem Question 
Given that the inequalities referred to in the SAICA report (1992) could still arise, the lack 
of legislative guidance provided and furthermore considering the view expressed in the 
SARS Share Owner’s Guide, this study seeks to address the following question: is it possible 
to hedge with a derivative on capital account? Put differently, can one make a capital gain 
on a derivatives hedge? 
In order to address this question, it is proposed to investigate whether or not the sale of a 
futures contract used as a hedge against losses on an underlying share investment, held as 
a capital asset, should be taxed on revenue account or if in fact an argument can be made 
for this gain to be treated as capital in nature. 
1.3. Objectives of the study 
This study will focus on the gains made on individual equity futures contracts (hereafter 
referred to as ‘Single Stock Futures’),8 entered into as a hedge against anticipated losses in 
value on the same underlying share (that is the subject of the Single Stock Futures contract) 
which is held as a capital investment, where the shareholder does not wish to (or cannot) 
completely disinvest from (i.e. sell) such shares.9 
Given the absence of any legislative determination or definitive legal precedent regarding 
the tax treatment of hedging of this sort, there is no legal certainty as to the correct tax 
treatment of gains made in the manner described above. As such, a gap exists in the current 
body of tax knowledge. The aim is to contribute to this general body of tax knowledge by 
trying to determine whether a taxpayer could successfully treat gains made on a futures 
contract, used to hedge a capital share investment, as capital in nature. 
This need for clarity becomes especially pressing when one considers that the applicable tax 
treatment for capital gains leads to a more favourable result (i.e. lower effective tax rate) for 
the taxpayer than if these gains were to be taxed on revenue account. The outcome of this 
research therefore stands to materially benefit the taxpayer. Furthermore, in the context of 
a portfolio in a collective investment scheme (‘CIS’), be it a CIS in securities or for that 
                                                   
8 The use of the phrase ‘The sale of futures contracts…’ by SARS in the Share Owners Guide may be 
misleading. What is in fact being taxed here is the gain made on the Single Stock Futures contract, 
irrespective of how it is closed out. The mechanics of how this gain is realised, through the variation 
margin that needs to be paid over the life of the derivative, are considered in 2.2 below. 
9 For example, the taxpayer may believe in the long term fundamentals of the company and not wish 
to disinvest completely, or could in fact be ‘locked in’ to his or her shareholding and precluded from 
selling for a period of time, in accordance with the terms of a previous merger transaction through 
which the shares were acquired. 
4 
matter a hedge fund,10 it is only gains made on capital account in the portfolio that are not 
taxable.11 To the extent then that the fund manager enters into hedging transactions using 
Single Stock Futures, in order to hedge a particular underlying share investment held on 
capital account, the outcome of this research as to whether such gains may be treated as 
capital in nature is equally relevant. 
1.4. Methodology 
This doctrinal study will begin, in chapter two, with an introduction to futures contracts and 
a brief explanation of the mechanics of Single Stock Futures, as prescribed by the South 
African Futures Exchange (‘SAFEX’) in its capacity as the regulating exchange. The chapter 
will also consider the manner in which a gain may be realised when adopting of a ‘short 
position’ with Single Stock Futures, as well as the basic principles of hedging and how the 
desired objective may be realised using Single Stock Futures. 
This study will then proceed in chapter three with a brief review of some existing South 
African decisions regarding the taxation of gains made from derivative instruments and/or 
gains derived from the employment of hedging strategies. 
Chapter four will analyse the view and authority proffered in the SARS Share Owners Guide 
for the proposed revenue classification of gains made when hedging a capital share 
investment with Single Stock Futures contracts. 
Chapter five will then set out a discussion of alternative arguments which should also be 
considered when determining the income tax nature of a futures hedging gain. This will 
consist of reviewing the alternative analogous arguments proposed by certain writers, 
considering any case law that substantiates these positions and comparing the tax treatment 
in certain selected international jurisdictions. 
Chapter six will then consider certain fundamental common law principles of the capital 
and revenue determination found in the South African jurisprudence, in order to identify 
any arguments which might be applicable to futures hedging. Whilst the decisions handed 
down in previous judgments unquestionably would have depended on the specific facts and 
                                                   
10 A portfolio of a CIS includes, for tax purposes, both a CIS in securities and a declared CIS in terms 
of the section 1 definition. A ‘portfolio of a declared collective investment scheme’ is defined in 
section 1 to mean ‘any portfolio comprised in any declared collective investment scheme 
contemplated in Part VII of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act’. In terms of Government 
Notice No. 141 issued by National Treasury on 25 February 2015, the business of a hedge fund was 
declared to be a collective investment scheme for purposes of the Collective Investment Schemes 
Control Act. 
11 The portfolio of a CIS is only able to disregard capital gains in terms of paragraph 61(3). Any gains 
made on income account would be taxable. 
5 
circumstances of the relevant taxpayers in question, it is submitted that the arguments and 
common law principles identified in these sources (whilst not attempting to provide a 
universal solution or simple checklist), would nonetheless provide a good indication as to 
how a court could view a question on the capital or revenue nature of gains made hedging a 
capital share investment with Single Stock Futures contracts. 
Chapter seven will then weigh up the arguments in the preceding four chapters, both for 
and against the capital nature of gains made hedging a capital share investment with Single 
Stock Futures, in order to determine what, on balance, the correct tax treatment should be. 
Finally, chapter eight will contain a summary of the issue raised, the conclusions drawn and 
recommendations for further research. 
1.5. Limitations to the study 
This study will only look at one example of a hedging strategy, with one example of a 
derivative instrument, and will furthermore only consider the tax treatment for gains made 
in this regard. 
The hedging strategy considered will be the practice of entering into a Single Stock Futures 
contract to ‘short sell’ a company’s shares already held, where it is anticipated that the value 
of the shares may decline in the future but it is not desired (or possible) to sell the actual 
shares themselves, in order to preserve the performance of the investment. 
No consideration will be given to other common hedging practices such as ‘going long’ with 
Single Stock Futures to hedge the acquisition price of a share not yet held,12 or other 
potential hedges such as, for example, foreign exchange hedges,13 or the hedging of trading 
stock still to be acquired or which is currently held.14 
All other derivatives such as, for example, option contracts, swap agreements or agricultural 
derivatives are also excluded from this study. The research would equally be relevant to 
                                                   
12 For the sake of completeness SAICA (op cit note 1) at 22, notes that international precedent 
determines the tax treatment of the profit or loss on such a hedge with reference to the nature of the 
underlying anticipated transaction. See also ITC 1498 (1989) 53 SATC 260, discussed in 3.2 and 5.3 
below, where a gain made whilst hedging the cost of acquisition of a capital asset was treated as 
capital in nature since the court decided that the forward exchange contracts hedge should ‘assume 
the character of their originating cause’. 
13 These are not selected for the study because their inclusion would require consideration of 
section 24I which, it is submitted, does not fit within the ambit of this study and would better be 
evaluated in a separate research paper. 
14 It is submitted that gains realised hedging the acquisition of trading stock would likely be seen to 
be revenue in nature, and so are not useful for purposes of this study which seeks to consider whether 
such gains can be capital in nature. 
6 
gains made hedging an underlying share portfolio with index futures contracts,15 whose use 
in the market is more ubiquitous. Only Single Stock Futures, as a specific subtype of forward 
contract, will however be considered. This is because the precise scenario on which SARS 
has expressed a strong, if perhaps unsubstantiated, view in the Share Owners Guide relates 
to Single Stock Futures, and also because Single Stock Futures allow for a ‘simple’ and 
‘direct’ hedging example to be considered first (where a standardised, traded forward 
contract to sell the underlying share held is used to hedge anticipated losses on that 
particular share). 
The treatment of losses realised on derivatives hedges is equally important (especially if a 
taxpayer seeks to treat such losses as revenue deductions) but this question will however be 
left as a matter for further research (to keep this study within required limits). 
Finally, no consideration will be given to speculators or investors in Single Stock Futures 
alone – the focus of this study will only be on hedging a capital share portfolio using Single 
Stock Futures. 
 
                                                   
15 A derivative instrument whose value is based on price movements of a basket of equities. 
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CHAPTER 2 HEDGING WITH FUTURES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In his book Politics, Aristotle recounts one of the earliest written records of using ‘futures’ 
in the story of a poor philosopher from Miletus named Thales. According to this anecdote 
Thales was criticised for his poverty, which apparently showed that philosophy was of no 
use. Thales however: 
‘knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be 
a great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little money, 
he gave deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, 
which he hired at a low price because no one bid against him. When the 
harvest time came, and many were wanted all at once and of a sudden, 
he let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of 
money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich if 
they like, but that their ambition is of another sort.’16 
Thales therefore secured for himself (forward purchased) the exclusive right of use of these 
olive-presses in the future when the harvest would be ready, and because he correctly 
anticipated an increase in demand for olive-presses once the harvest was gathered, the 
canny philosopher ended up ‘in the money’. 
Amongst the oldest known traded derivatives were the rice futures traded on the Dojima 
Rice Exchange in Osaka, Japan. These have been traded since the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. 
In South Africa, traded Single Stock Futures were introduced by the SAFEX in 1999. These 
derivatives are now offered on approximately 600 JSE Securities Exchange (‘JSE’) listed 
companies.17 
2.2. Entering into Single Stock Futures through the SAFEX 
Single Stock Futures contracts are, at their core, forward purchase agreements whereby one 
party agrees to purchase listed shares from another party (who agrees to sell), at a specified 
                                                   
16 Aristotle, Politics, translated by Benjamin Jowett, book 1, chapter XI, n.d. Available: 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html [2014, January 1]. 
17 The JSE overview to Single Stock Futures. Available: https://www.jse.co.za/trade/derivative-
market/equity-derivatives/single-stock-derivatives/single-stock-futures [2018, February 15]. 
8 
price and on a specified future date. What makes a Single Stock Futures contract unique is 
that it is a forward purchase agreement concluded via an exchange (in this instance, the 
SAFEX).18 The conclusion of the Single Stock Futures contract is therefore governed, inter 
alia, by the ‘Derivative Rules’ for the SAFEX,19 as well as the Single Stock Futures contract 
specifications as set out by the JSE. As a result, the SAFEX regulates the implementation 
and operation of these Single Stock Futures contracts entered into by taxpayers.20 Since a 
Single Stock Futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell one hundred shares in the stock 
underlying the derivative, at a certain future point in time, the notional value of the Single 
Stock Futures contract is, in the ordinary course, equal to one hundred times the value of 
the share underlying the futures contract. 
When a taxpayer chooses to enter into a Single Stock Futures contract it is either to actually 
deliver (or to take actual delivery of) the underlying share contracted for upon expiry of the 
contract (referred to as ‘physically settled’ futures contracts), or alternatively to settle the 
Single Stock Futures contract in cash. Upon expiry the cash difference between the 
prevailing market spot price and the agreed contract price for the underlying share changes 
hands (referred to as ‘cash settled’ futures contracts).21 
A physically settled Single Stock Futures contract entered into on the SAFEX always 
involves one party agreeing to sell the underlying share on a future date (adopting what is 
known as a ‘short position’), and another party agreeing to purchase that share on that 
future date (a ‘long position’). Upon the ultimate expiry of the contract, the short position 
would be required to perform through delivery of such underlying share. Conversely, 
performance by the long position entails the purchase of the underlying share by making 
payment of the ‘mark-to-market’ price22 for that share on the trading day immediately 
preceding the delivery day.23 
                                                   
18 As opposed to a forward purchase concluded in terms of an ‘over the counter’ contract between the 
parties. 
19 JSE, Derivative Rules, 28 April 2017 (hereafter the ‘Derivative Rules’). Available: 
https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSERulesPoliciesandRegulationItems/DerivativesRules [2018, 
February 15] 
20 They are therefore standardised contracts with set specifications regarding size (the number of 
shares per contact) and set expiry dates for the contracts. 
21 In terms of paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘futures contract’ in the Derivative Rules, this is a 
contract where a person agrees to deliver the underlying instrument to (or receive it from) another 
person at an agreed price on a future date. In terms of paragraph (b) of this definition, a ‘futures 
contract’ also includes a contract where a person will pay to (or receive from) another person an 
amount of money according to whether, on the future date, the price or value of the underlying 
instrument is higher or lower than the agreed price on that future date. 
22 The Derivative Rules define ‘mark-to-market’ as meaning the ‘revaluation of a position in the 
exchange contract at its current market value’. 
23 Rule 8.40.7 of the Derivative Rules provides that on the expiry of a physically settled futures 
contract the holder of a long position in the exchange contract shall buy the underlying instrument 
9 
In the case of cash settled futures contracts, upon expiry it is only the cash difference 
between the prevailing market spot price and the agreed contract price for the underlying 
share which is paid. The ‘short position’ holder makes payment to the ‘long position’ if the 
value of the underlying share has risen over the term of the contract. Where the price of the 
underlying has decreased over this period, the opposite is true, and it is the ‘long position’ 
holder who is required to make payment of this decrease in value to the ‘short position’ 
holder.24 
Once entered into, it is possible for the holder of a Single Stock Futures contract to exit the 
contract before the expiry date (known as ‘closing the position’), by adopting an equal and 
opposite position in the same exchange contract.25 Alternatively, the holder may decide to 
keep the contract until the expiration date and then ‘roll the contract’ (i.e. close the current 
contract and open a new, identical contract for a new future expiry date). 
Importantly however it should be noted that the economic benefit of both physically settled 
and cash settled contracts is received over the life of the contract through the effect of the 
required ‘margin payments’, and not solely upon settlement on the expiry date. 
The SAFEX places accessory obligations on the parties to a Single Stock Futures contract to 
make certain payments, known as ‘margin payments’, both when entering into the contract 
and then subsequently on a daily basis for the duration of the contract. These margin 
payments are made in order to protect the relative parties involved, as well as to protect the 
integrity of the SAFEX.26 These margin payments are required as security in order to ensure 
that performance is actually made on the future date. 
The margin payments prescribed by the SAFEX are as follows: 
                                                   
and the holder of a short position shall sell the underlying instrument, at the price equal to the expiry 
price. 
24 The Derivative Rules define a ‘short position’, in relation to futures contracts, as a position where 
the contracting party is ‘obliged to make delivery of the underlying instrument at the agreed price 
on the future date or to pay an amount of money if, on the future date, the price or value of the 
underlying instrument is greater than the agreed price’. Conversely, a ‘long position’ is defined as 
the situation where the individual is ‘obliged to take delivery of the underlying instrument from the 
seller at the agreed price on the future date or to pay an amount of money to the seller if, on the 
future date, the price or value of the underlying instrument is less than the agreed price’. 
25 Refer to the definition of ‘close out’ in the Derivative Rules. For example, a ‘long’ position in an 
exchange contract (i.e. a position where one agrees to acquire the shares underlying the future) is 
cancelled by entering into a ‘short’ position in the same exchange contract (i.e. a position in terms of 
which one agrees to sell such shares underlying the future). 
26 The SAFEX acts as the clearing house for all futures positions traded on the exchange. 
10 
• An initial deposit with the SAFEX, payable on conclusion of the futures contract, 
known as the ‘initial margin’,27 and 
• Additional payments to be made thereafter, on a daily basis, known as the ‘variation 
margin’. The amount to be paid on a daily basis is determined through a process 
known as ‘marking-to-market’.28 This entails the payment, on the first day of the 
contract, of the difference between the price agreed in the futures contract and the 
market value of the underlying shares at the close of the first day. For each day 
thereafter, payment of the difference between the market value at the close of the 
previous day and the market value at the close of that day is made.29 
Upon expiry of a Single Stock Futures contract, or on the closing of a position, the economic 
effect of all cash flows representing margin payments effected by the parties over the period 
of the contract should reflect the total profit or loss to the holders of the reciprocal futures 
contract. 
In the present instance, it is the variation margin payments received by the short position 
holder on a correctly place hedge, before the position is closed out, that represent the gains 
which are being considered in this study. 
The effect of variation margin payments is best explained by way of the following basic 
example, using a physically settled futures contract: 
• The taxpayer enters into a Single Stock Futures contract on day 1 in terms whereof 
he agrees to sell 100 of the shares underlying the contract for R1 000 in three 
months’ time. The market value of the 100 shares on day 1 is also R1 000. 
• On day 30, if the market value of the underlying shares: 
                                                   
27 The amount of initial margin required is approximately 10% - 15% of the value of the underlying 
shares. This initial margin is in essence an estimate of the maximum amount that is likely to be lost 
in one day, and remains on deposit for as long as the open position is maintained. 
28 Rule 8.60.2 of the Derivative Rules provides that the variation margin shall be paid as a result of 
marking-to-market of an open position. 
29 The idea behind variation margin is that each contract is ‘settled’ each day, and thus only retains 
one day’s worth of credit risk, which remains offset by the initial margin deposited with the clearing 
house. The margining system is therefore effective in ensuring that both buyer and seller are 
constantly up-to-date in their profits and losses, thereby mitigating the risk of either party defaulting 
on a payment. 
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i. Has increased by R30 to a value of R1 030, the taxpayer/seller would have 
been required to pay daily variation margin payments totalling R30 (over the 
preceding 30 days) to the purchasing counterparty (via the SAFEX).30 
ii. Has alternatively decreased by R20 to a value of R980, the purchaser would 
have been required to make daily variation margin payments to the 
taxpayer/seller totalling R20 over the period.31 
• On day 90, when the taxpayer/seller is required to close out the Single Stock Futures 
contract, if the market value has remained unchanged since day 30, then the 
taxpayer tenders delivery of the underlying shares in exchange for the payment by 
the purchaser of the amount equal to the market value on the close of the day 
immediately preceding the delivery day (being either R1 030 or R980 in the above 
example). 
Economically, the taxpayer has sold the underlying shares for the agreed R1 000 price, and 
the counterparty has paid the same agreed price, when the effect of the variation margin 
payments is added (or subtracted as the case may be) from the final market value price 
actually paid on delivery. 
In the case of a cash settled futures contracts, the effect of the daily variation margin is that 
final performance upon expiry is only the payment of the difference between the market 
value at the close of the previous day and the market value on the date of expiry. The balance 
of the cash difference between the prevailing market spot price on expiry, and the originally 
agreed contract price for the underlying share, would already have been paid to the party 
who was ‘in the money’ by virtue of the daily variation margin payments effected. 
                                                   
30 Where the price of stock has risen subsequent to the conclusion of the Single Stock Futures 
contract, the purchaser may be concerned that the seller would not honour the Single Stock Futures 
contract because he may be tempted to dispose of the underlying shares in the market for more than 
the agreed price of R1 000. In that case, the purchaser receives security in the form of the variation 
margin payments from the seller. 
31 Where the price of the underlying stock has dropped since the conclusion of the Single Stock 
Futures contract, the seller may be concerned that the purchaser would rather acquire the underlying 
shares in the market for the lesser value (i.e. R980), than honour the agreed Single Stock Futures 
contract. The seller therefore receives security, in the form of the variation margin payments from 
the purchaser. 
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2.3. The concept of ‘hedging’ 
The concept of ‘hedging’, in the sense of ‘to insure oneself against loss, as in a bet, by 
playing something on the other side’, dates from 1670’s.32 
One of the most notable developments in this regard was the formation in the nineteenth 
century of the forerunner to the present day Chicago Mercantile Exchange (the world’s 
largest modern futures exchange), in order to standardise a practice that had developed in 
the area. At around that time, agricultural commodity producers and merchants in 
America’s mid-west had started to enter into contracts to establish the price of grain 
commodities to be delivered at a specific date in the future, before the commodities were 
harvested (i.e. a forward contract). Both the producers and the merchants did this in order 
to protect themselves against subsequent unfavourable price fluctuations, which were 
frequently caused by surpluses and shortages of these grain products. These contracts 
therefore enabled both the producers and the merchants to ‘cash forward’ and insulate 
themselves from the risk of adverse price change. 
The hedge is a procedure used to offset or counterbalance risk (such as, for example, price 
risk) associated with an underlying transaction. For the risk to be managed with the hedge, 
an instrument is required whose value displays a high degree of inverse correlation with the 
value of the position hedged.33 
In the modern commercial environment, a hedge would therefore be most simply described 
as follows: 
‘To use two compensating or offsetting transactions to ensure a position 
of breakeven; to make advance arrangements to safeguard oneself from 
loss on an investment’34 
In the context of a share investment, a hedge may therefore be utilised by the share investor 
to mitigate the risk of potential losses which are anticipated to occur. 
                                                   
32 Refer to the definition provided for the term ‘Hedge’ in the Online Etymology Dictionary. Available: 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=hedge [2014, January 2]. 
33 Sub-committee of the Tax Advisory Committee (op cit note 5), at 63. 
34 Black’s Law Dictionary, 2007 8th Edition. See also the Oxford Online Dictionary: ‘Protect oneself 
against loss on (a bet or investment) by making balancing or compensating transactions’. 
Available: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/hedge [2014, November 26]. 
Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary definition of ‘hedge’ as ‘to protect oneself from losing or failing 
by a counterbalancing action’ accords with this. Available: http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/hedge [2014, November 26]. 
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According to the JSE, one of the reasons why investors in the stock market make use of 
Single Stock Futures is to ‘hedge’ their portfolio. In the view of the JSE: 
‘Hedgers seek to reduce risk by protecting an existing share portfolio 
against possible adverse price movements in the physical (or spot) 
market. Hedgers have a real interest in the underlying shares and use 
futures as a means of preserving their performance.’35 
This is precisely the scenario envisaged in this study. Whilst a gain is realised on the Single 
Stock Futures contracts (which SARS, according to the Share Owners Guide, proposes to 
tax on revenue account), they are entered into in order to: (i) guard against losses in value 
in an underlying capital investment, brought about by adverse share price movements; and 
(ii) preserve the growth performance which that share had already generated. 
This objective is achieved when entering into a short position in respect of the underlying 
shares held, which the shareholder doesn’t wish to actually sell, because the shareholder 
receives a variation margin payment over the life of the contract if the value of the shares 
does drop as anticipated. The shareholder has therefore been able to hedge the fluctuations 
in the underlying share price, and may be said to be ‘hedging’ a long position (the 
investment) by entering into a short position (the sale) in respect of that share.36 
 
                                                   
35 JSE, ‘Powerful tools for investing, speculating and hedging’. Available: 
https://www.intrepidcapital.co.za/Portals/0/JSE%20Documents/Brochure%20-
%20Equity%20SSF.pdf [2018, February 15]. 
36 Mathematically, the return from a short position should be equivalent to that of owning (being 
long) ‘a negative amount’ of the underlying instrument. 
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CHAPTER 3 SOUTH AFRICAN CASE LAW ON DERIVATIVES HEDGING 
 
It is appropriate to start this analysis with a brief review of some existing South African 
decisions regarding the taxation of gains made from derivative instruments and/or gains 
derived from the employment of hedging strategies. Whilst these may not directly answer 
the question at hand, they are still a source to which reference can and should be made when 
determining the nature of gains made hedging a capital share investment with Single Stock 
Futures. 
3.1. Income Tax Case No 43 
In ITC 43 (1925),37 the first South African case on the taxation of futures, the taxpayer (a 
country storekeeper who entered into transactions in grain and other produce as part of his 
business) had accepted an offer for the future delivery of grain. When there was a sudden 
rise in the price of grain, the suppliers (facing a loss on these futures contracts) paid the 
taxpayer certain amounts as consideration for their cancellation. The taxpayer took the view 
that these amounts were ‘gambles in futures’ and as isolated, speculative transactions did 
not fall to be included in his gross income. The taxpayer’s argument was in effect that these 
amounts did not relate to his profit-making activities. This was, it is submitted, a flawed 
approach to adopt. 
On appeal against their inclusion as gross income by the Commissioner, the court held that 
the profit realised by the taxpayer (as a dealer in produce) with a futures contract for grain 
was itself also a ‘deal in produce’ and fell within the scope of his business. The amounts were 
therefore held to be taxable, as it was the court’s view that the profit depended very much 
on the knowledge the appellant had acquired through his occupation as a dealer in 
produce.38 To the extent that the decision was based upon an assessment of the closeness of 
connection to the taxpayer’s profit-making activities this case does not offer much 
assistance in addressing the problem question. 
3.2. Income Tax Case No 340 
In ITC 340 (1935),39 the taxpayer made gains using forward exchange contracts which had 
been entered into in order to meet amounts of Pound Sterling for which his trading business 
                                                   
37 2 SATC 115. 
38 Ibid at 115. 
39 8 SATC 362. 
15 
was liable in terms of orders for the import of goods from the United Kingdom, made in 
connection with that business. 
The court was of the view that the taxpayer had not only intended to mitigate potential loss, 
but in fact had an intention to make a profit from the forward exchange contracts as well. 
However, it was ultimately unnecessary for the court to decide on this aspect. Since the 
orders were an integral part of the taxpayers business (i.e. the acquisition of trading stock), 
the profit derived on the forward exchange contracts taken out in respect thereof was seen 
by the court to be part of the taxable profit derived from that business.40 Similar to the 
previous decision, the closeness of connection to the profit-making activities drove the 
decision in this case. This is also therefore of limited use in the present instance. 
3.3. Income Tax Case No 1498 
In ITC 1498 (1989),41 the taxpayer made a gain hedging the cost of acquisition of a capital 
asset in the form of a printing press from the United States of America. The taxpayer had 
hedged its Dollar denominated foreign capital expenditure by making use of forward 
exchange contracts. Jennett J held that the gains realised were of a capital nature since 
‘there is no reason why the foreign exchange contracts which relate to the repayment of 
the loan for the purpose of acquiring the printing press should not assume the character 
of their originating cause’.42 
This case is therefore of far more assistance in addressing the problem question and will be 
considered again in more detail in 5.3 below. 
3.4. Income Tax Case No 1756 
In ITC 1756 (1997),43 futures contracts were entered into by the taxpayer to hedge the cost 
of acquisition of an intended long-term share portfolio. On an appeal by the taxpayer against 
the inclusion of gains made on these futures contracts in its gross income, the court 
expressed the opinion that the evidence led by the taxpayer did not adequately place it in a 
position to be able to adjudicate on whether the gains in question resulted from a scheme 
of profit-making, and had it been required to answer the question on its merits (it was not, 
due to the case being decided on a technicality), the court indicated that it would have had 
                                                   
40 Ibid at 365. 
41 53 SATC 260. 
42 Ibid at 265. 
43 65 SATC 375. 
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no option but to find against the taxpayer on the basis that it had failed to discharge its onus 
of proof. 
As one of the authorities cited by SARS in support of their comments in the Share Owners 
Guide, this case is examined in more detail in 4.2 below. 
3.5. Income Tax Case No 1223 
In ITC 1223 (1974),44 the taxpayer company was set up as a family investment vehicle to 
maintain the family in the future. As part of the diversification of the investment portfolio, 
the taxpayer invested in shares in various listed companies. Due to concerns over the 
potentially imminent decline in share prices in the market, the taxpayer however disposed 
of all of these share investments (at a profit) within one year of their acquisition. 
Notwithstanding the short holding period, the court found that the profit realised on the 
disposal of the shares in question (other than those acquired in newly listed companies and 
disposed of shortly after their listing) was capital in nature because the shares had been 
disposed of in order to protect the taxpayer’s capital and not as part of a profit-making 
scheme.45 The applicability of this decision to answering the problem question is therefore 
also potentially problematic, given that hedging with Single Stock Futures contracts (though 
achieving the same economic result) avoids the need to liquidate an entire investment. 
In the next chapter we will consider in more detail the SARS’ position stated in their Share 
Owners Guide, and the authority cited in support thereof. 
 
                                                   
44 37 SATC 24. 
45 Ibid at 28-29. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE SARS VIEW 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Given its inclusion under the heading ‘Low or nil return’ in the Share Owners Guide, in the 
context of general principles to be considered when deciding on a matter of capital or 
revenue interpretation, one is left with the impression that SARS considers the fact that 
futures contracts derive no return for the holder (such as dividends or interest) to mean 
that, ipso facto, their acquisition and sale should be treated as a revenue transaction.46 
In order to consider whether SARS’ stated position in their Share Owners Guide should be 
accepted as a proper exposition of the law in this regard, this study continues with a review 
of the authority cited in support of the taxation of the sales of futures contracts on revenue 
account even where used as a hedge against losses on underlying shares held as capital 
assets.47 
4.2. Income Tax Case No 1756 
The Appellant taxpayer in ITC 1756 (1997) was a trust established during 1974 for the 
benefit of the donor’s grandchildren. Upon the death of the donor some years later the trust 
inherited her major shareholding in a private company. When the value of this asset was 
subsequently realised during October 1987, the trustees determined that the R15 million 
realised should be invested in the share market, so that the portfolio could be professionally 
administered for the donor’s grandchildren ‘with growth potential as the main object’.48 
The investment strategy was to acquire ‘blue chip’ shares. However the prevailing economic 
collapse in world stock markets in late 1987 hindered the trust in its ability to acquire the 
shares which it sought. The portfolio administrators utilised by the trustees felt that the 
combination of the desired intention to acquire a long-term share portfolio, and the 
prevailing political and economic uncertainty, necessitated a ‘dual strategy’ of investing 
                                                   
46 This, and other similar factors which are not per se definitive (such as the ‘fruit and tree’ analogy) 
will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6 below. 
47 The authority cited by SARS is ITC 1756 (1997) (supra note 43), decided in the Cape Tax Court, 
and the English Court of Appeal decision in Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes) [1969] 1 All 
ER 332. 
48 ITC 1756 (1997) (supra note 43) at 378. The trustees determined that the share portfolio was to be 
managed according to the certain guidelines, inter alia, that maximum capital growth was a priority, 
that a medium- to long-term investment philosophy was to be followed which was not speculative in 
nature, that any changes in investments were to be carried out to preserve capital values or income 
generating potential and that professional portfolio administrators were to utilised, and that they 
should be given full discretion to ensure the optimisation of these agreed investment objectives. 
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available cash on hand in short-term deposits, whilst simultaneously hedging against 
possible increases in the price of the unavailable shares sought, through the acquisition of 
‘All Share Futures’ contracts. 
The aim of this strategy was to secure the highest possible income return in the short-term 
(via the high yielding short-term cash deposits selected), and to ensure the long-term future 
dividend stream of the trust by fixing the cost at which the desired shares would be 
purchased as and when they became available in due course.49 It was felt by the trustees that 
this dual strategy would best manage the risk inherent in building up the intended long-
term portfolio too quickly. 
In deciding to enter into these futures contracts, the trustees of the Appellant followed the 
advice of the portfolio administrators, who had explained that these contracts should be 
acquired in order to maintain an adequate income stream for the trust through the cash 
investments while still gaining access to the desired blue chip shares which were, at that 
time, not readily available in the necessary quantity. The trustees were assured that the use 
of the futures contracts was not speculative.50 The object of the futures contracts was 
therefore to manage the risks inherent in building up the intended long-term share 
portfolio, by hedging the cost of acquisition of the assets. It was not to derive profits by 
trading in the futures contracts. 
The relevant ‘All Share Futures’ contracts were therefore purchased in February 1988, and 
subsequently sold in March 1989. Total gains of R537 085 were realised on the sale of these 
contracts. 
In the 1992 year of assessment the Appellant realised some of the shares in its portfolio. The 
trustees contended that the gains made on the realisation of these shares were capital in 
nature and are therefore not taxable.51 The Commissioner disagreed with this contention 
and included gains in the amount of R1 241 667 in the assessment of the Appellant’s taxable 
income for the 1992 year. In addition however to the gains realised on the sale of the shares 
in the portfolio the Respondent also included in the 1992 year of assessment the R537 085 
in gains realised in March 1989 on the sale of ‘All Share Futures’ contracts. For present 
purposes, only the gains realised on the sale of ‘All Share Futures’ contracts (and not the 
                                                   
49 Ibid at 378. 
50 Ibid at 382. In the face of conflicting testimony from the Appellant’s two witnesses, the court 
accepted that, on balance, the futures contracts were entered into to insure the trust against a rise in 
share prices. 
51 The trustees realised the shares to, firstly, finance building renovations on a commercial 
investment property which the Appellant owned and secondly because certain of the shares disposed 
of no longer fit with the Appellant’s portfolio requirements. 
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decision regarding the capital or revenue nature of the gains made from the realisation of 
shares in the investment portfolio) are relevant.52 
The court found that the determination of the taxability of gains made on the sale of ‘All 
Share Futures’ contracts raised a novel issue which had not yet received the attention of our 
courts. Unfortunately, in the opinion of the court, the evidence led by the Appellant did not 
adequately place it in a position to be able to adjudicate on whether the gains in question 
resulted from a scheme of profit-making.53 In order to make such a determination, the court 
was of the view that it would need to consider both the precise nature and operation of the 
‘futures market’, as well as the particular transactions entered into by the Appellant. The 
Appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence on both counts. 
What the court then said in this regard was that, had it been required to answer the question 
on its merits, it would have had no option but to find against the Appellant on the basis that 
it had failed to discharge the onus of proof which it bore and in terms of which it was 
required to show, on the balance of probabilities, that the Respondent had incorrectly 
included the amount of R537 085 in its taxable income. That question was however, not 
required to be answered on its merits once the court had established that the ‘All Share 
Futures’ contracts were in fact sold by the Appellant on 15 March 1989, since the profit on 
such sale accrued during the tax year which ended on 28 February 1990 (and did not as a 
result form part of the Appellant’s taxable income for the tax year ended 29 February 1992, 
where it had been included by the Respondent).54 
4.3. Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes) 
In the English decision in Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes) (1969)55 the 
taxpayer was advised that it was important to guard against a loss in the value of his capital 
                                                   
52 Which, incidentally, were held to have been disposed of on capital account by the Appellant. As 
such the gains of R1 241 667 made in the 1992 year were capital in nature and did not fall to be 
included in the gross income of the taxpayer. The court was satisfied that, on the evidence before it, 
the trustees of the Appellant were not engaged in a scheme of profit-making on the sale of the shares 
in the portfolio, and that furthermore they did not, at any stage, have a secondary or alternative (dual) 
purpose of making profits out of the shares of the trust. 
53 See in this regard however the comments of certain writers that the court upheld the argument that 
the period for which a financial instrument is held cannot in and of itself be decisive of the nature of 
the investment (Olivier, L. 2010. Law of Taxation, Annual Survey of South African Law, at page 947). 
54 ITC 1756 (1997) (supra note 43) at 386 to 388. In terms of section 5(1) of the Act, a taxpayer is only 
liable for the normal tax which can be levied upon taxable income received by or which accrues to 
him in that year of assessment. Consequently, the Appellant’s objection against the inclusion of the 
gains made from the sale of the ‘All Shares Futures’ contracts in March 1989 as part of the assessment 
of taxable income for 1992 was upheld. In the court’s view, not doing so would require the Appellant 
to have to pay tax on an amount not received by, or accrued to, it in the relevant year of assessment. 
55 Supra note 47. 
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assets which could be occasioned in the event of a devaluation of the Pound Sterling.56 He 
was advised to make another investment which would maintain its value against the US 
Dollar, which other investment should be saleable at a profit in the future in the event that 
there was any drop in the Pound Sterling value.57 
Therefore, the other investment was to serve as a hedge against the loss which would be 
occasioned by such a drop in value of the taxpayer’s Pound Sterling assets. The assets 
selected for investment were ingots or bars of silver.58 
When the threat of a Pound Sterling devaluation had lifted, and coincidently when the price 
of silver had also risen significantly, the taxpayer decided that the silver ingots should be 
sold, which duly realised a total profit of some £48 000.59 
The commissioners for income tax determined that this profit was derived from an 
‘adventure in the nature of trade’, and was therefore taxable,60 notwithstanding the fact 
that it was accepted that the taxpayer’s original intention in purchasing the silver was to act 
as a hedge against devaluation. This adventure in the nature of trade was, in the opinion of 
the commissioners, indicated inter alia by the fact that the nature of the silver ingots 
invested in was not that of an income-producing asset suitable for a long-term investment.61 
On appeal by the commissioners,62 the Court of Appeal took the view that the transactions 
were entered into ‘on a short-term basis for the purpose of making a profit out of the 
purchase and sale of a commodity’. This was for the court a clear adventure in the nature 
of trade because ‘the object of the transaction was to make a profit’. The fact that the reason 
for wanting to make a profit was that it was expected that a loss would be made on 
devaluation, did not change the fact that ‘the motive and object of the whole transaction 
                                                   
56 In 1961 (and again 1964 and 1966) the Pound Sterling came under pressure since the exchange rate 
against the US Dollar was considered too high. 
57 Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes) (1969) (supra note 47) at 334-335. 
58 Ibid at 335. This was in the opinion of the taxpayer’s financial advisor a stable commodity, which 
had not varied in value by more than 5% in the previous six years, and which would maintain its value 
and be sold at a good profit against the US Dollar if the United Kingdom devalued its Pound Sterling. 
59 Ibid at 335. 
60 In terms of the prevailing legislation, tax was exigible in the United Kingdom in respect of ‘any 
trade carried on in the United Kingdom’. The definition of ‘trade’ in turn included ‘every trade, 
manufacture, adventure or concern in the nature of trade’. This definition therefore enlarged the 
ambit of the taxing section, because the activity need not be a ‘trade’ in order to be taxable, provided 
it was an ‘adventure in the nature of trade’. 
61 Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes) (1969) (supra note 47) at 336. This view as to the 
unsuitability of the ingots for long term investment was strengthened by the fact that their acquisition 
was financed by high interest loans. 
62 The taxpayer’s objection to the commissioner’s assessment having been upheld by the court a quo 
on the basis that because it was a hedge against devaluation, it was not a trading adventure. Refer to 
Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes) [1968] 2 All ER 714. 
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was to buy on a short-term basis a commodity with a view to its re-sale at a profit’.63 It 
was not, in the mind of the court, any less of a trading adventure merely by virtue of the fact 
that it was something to offset a loss occasioned by (i.e. to act as a hedge against) 
devaluation. The fact that the ‘hedge’ was seemingly entirely unrelated to the underlying 
asset being protected clearly played a significant role in this decision.64 
In the next chapter we will consider arguments for the determination of the tax nature of a 
derivatives hedge based on analogy. 
 
                                                   
63 Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes) (1969) (supra note 47) at 336. 
64 See 7.2.2 below for further comment on the impact which this has on the suitability of this authority 
for SARS’ expressed view. 
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CHAPTER 5 DETERMINING THE TAX NATURE OF A DERIVATIVES 
HEDGE BY ANALOGY 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter will set out various arguments which, it is submitted, should be taken into 
consideration when determining the nature of any gains made by a taxpayer when hedging 
losses on underlying shares held as capital assets with a derivative. 
These arguments determine the tax treatment of the derivative hedge by means of 
comparison and may be broadly classified as follows: 
• The derivative hedge is akin to an insurance contract, and the tax treatment should 
follow this analogy; or 
• The tax treatment of the derivative hedge should follow the analogous tax treatment 
of the underlying asset. 
These arguments will be discussed in more detail under separate headings in this chapter. 
5.2. The derivative hedge is akin to an insurance contract, and the tax 
treatment should follow this 
5.2.1. The ‘substitution’ guideline 
The common thread underlying this argument is that where an amount received is intended 
to act as an effective ‘substitute’ for something else lost or given up, the income tax nature 
of this receipt needs to be determined with reference to this substitution. 
This so-called ‘substitution’ guideline developed into South African tax law when the need 
for a new method of determining the capital or revenue nature of a receipt arose because 
none of the general guidelines developed to that point found precise application. The 
principle is based on English jurisprudence, viz the decision in Burmah Steam Ship Co Ltd 
v IRC (1930).65 This case dealt with damages which were awarded in compensation for a 
                                                   
65 (1930) 16 TC 67 (Court of Sessions), 1931 SC 156. This test appears to have been adopted into South 
African law as far back as 1942 – refer for example to ITC 527 (1942) 12 SATC 430. It is noted that 
this idea is not just seen in our tax law, or in the English law from which it is derived, but is also seen 
in Australian tax law. In the case of FCT v Dixon (1952) 86 CLR 540 the court says at 568: ‘But it is 
intended to be, and is in fact, a substitute for – the equivalent pro tanto of – the salary or wages 
which would have been earned and paid if the enlistment had not taken place. As such, it must be 
income, even though it is paid voluntarily and there is not even a moral obligation to continue 
making the payments. It acquires the character of that for which it is substituted and that to which 
it is added.’. 
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delay in delivering a ship, which damages were based on an estimate of the loss of profits. 
These damages were held to fall within ‘profits or gains’, and were therefore assessable, 
since the court found that they: 
‘must go, as a matter of proper commercial accounting to “fill the hole” 
in the appellant’s profits’66 
The test to be applied as laid down in this case therefore consists of the following essential 
question: 
‘Which hole was the receipt to fill, a hole in the profits or a hole in the 
assets?’67 
If the amount received in substitution fills a hole in the profits of the taxpayer, the payment 
will generally be regarded as income. Similarly if it fills a hole in the capital structure of the 
taxpayer, the receipt would be regarded as capital in nature. 
Whilst originally developed in the context of damages, this guideline is today applied to the 
receipt of an amount: 
• constituting damages (i.e. an amount paid by one person to another, as 
compensation for any loss or damage suffered by the latter as a result of the unlawful 
act or breach of contract of the former);68 
• as compensation for the renunciation of a right;69 or 
                                                   
66 Lord Clyde stated as follows at 71: ‘Suppose someone who chartered one of the Appellant's vessels 
breached the charter and exposed himself to a claim of damages at the Appellant’s instance, there 
could, I imagine, be no doubt that the damages recovered would properly enter the Appellant’s 
profit and loss account for the year. The reason would be that the breach of the charter was an 
injury inflicted on the Appellant’s trading, making (so to speak) a hole in the Appellant's profits, 
and the damages recovered could not therefore be reasonably or appropriately put by the Appellant 
– in accordance with the principles of sound commercial accounting – to any other purpose than 
to fill that hole.’ 
67 See also Estate A G Bourke v CIR 1991 (1) SA 661 (A), 53 SATC 86 where Hoexter JA confirms this 
test at 93 as follows: ‘a test which is sometimes applied is to ask the question whether the 
compensation was designed to fill a hole in the taxpayer’s profits, or whether it was intended to fill 
a hole in his assets’. 
68 See for example ITC 723 (1951) 17 SATC 496 where the court comments as follows at 496: ‘It seems 
clear that an amount received such as the present, by way of damages … is income and not capital, 
if the transaction out of which the claim for damages arose is a transaction which, had it been 
completed, would have resulted in an income and not in a capital gain or loss as the case might be.’ 
69 See for example CIR v Illovo Sugar Estates Ltd 1951 (1) SA 306 (N), 17 SATC 387 at 393 where the 
court stated that because the canefields in question (which were requisitioned by the military and 
naval authorities) had a long life span and were ‘an essential part of the equipment of the cane-
grower’s income-producing machine’ (and therefore part of his capital) the compensation received 
for the premature termination of the leases over these farms (i.e. the renunciation of a right over 
these farms) was capital in nature. 
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• in terms of an insurance contract.70 
It is the last of these, namely the contract of insurance, which it is proposed is applicable to 
the futures hedge in question in this dissertation. 
The essential element of the ‘substitution’ guideline is the function which the substituted 
amount fulfils in the hands of the recipient taxpayer. It is this element which must be 
determined for the application of the rule to yield an answer as to the capital or revenue 
nature of the amount received. 
However, given the direct correlation which is drawn between the amount replaced and the 
amount received in substitution, in certain instances it is also necessary to consider the 
actual nature of that which is lost in order to apply the substitution guideline properly.71 
Given the statements in ITC 594 (1945) (where the court determined that the nature of an 
amount which is received in terms of an insurance policy takes its character from the nature 
of the amount which it replaces),72 and given that the analogy drawn to futures hedging is 
that it is akin to an insurance contract, it is submitted that one should in the present context 
evaluate the gain derived from the futures position both in terms of the function which it 
fulfils and the nature of the amount lost and substituted. 
5.2.1.1. Function fulfilled by the substituted amount 
The decision in Taeuber & Corssen (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1975)73 illustrates how, in the 
application of the substitution guideline, determining the function of the compensation in 
the hands of the recipient aides in determining the tax nature of the receipt. In this case an 
agent who agreed not to sell products in competition with its principal for a period of two 
years after the termination of their agency agreement, and who was compensated as a result, 
was seen to have agreed to a reduction in the scope of its income-producing machine. 
Consequently, the compensation received was paid in respect of the sterilization of the 
taxpayer’s rights to deal in the competitive products, and was held to be a receipt of a capital 
nature. It should be noted that the amount was not paid as compensation in lieu of future 
commissions which were lost, and was equally not capital in nature merely because it was 
compensation for the termination of the agency agreement itself (i.e. compensation for the 
                                                   
70 See ITC 594 (1945) 14 SATC 249 at 250, also discussed below, where the court determined that the 
nature of an amount which is received in terms of an insurance policy takes its character from the 
nature of the amount which it replaces (i.e. the amount which would have been received but for the 
occurrence of the event insured against). 
71 Refer to Estate A G Bourke v CIR (1991) (supra note 67). 
72 Supra note 70 at 250. 
73 1975 (3) SA 649 (A), 37 SATC 129. 
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loss of a capital asset), but was rather capital in nature because it functioned to sterilize the 
taxpayer’s rights to deal in competitive products.74 
The following instances further exhibit how the function which the substituted amount 
fulfils can determine the tax nature of the receipt: 
• Damages paid to a lessor to compensate for the capital costs incurred in effecting 
structural changes to the leased premises, necessary to be able to lease it once again, 
were capital in nature because the damages functioned to compensate the taxpayer 
for the decrease in the value of his income-producing asset;75 
• A settlement paid to a taxpayer in respect of a claim for damages for a failed joint 
venture was revenue in nature, because the joint venture was a scheme of profit-
making and the settlement functioned to terminate the taxpayer’s claim for 
compensation for the revenue amounts that would otherwise have been derived;76 
and 
• Where the taxpayer receives an amount as compensation for a restraint placed on 
his right to claim damages for the reduction in his capacity to earn income, the 
receipt is capital in nature since it functions to compensate the taxpayer for a 
renunciation of his right to claim damages stemming from the injury to his income-
producing ability.77 
As can be seen, this determination of the nature of the compensatory amount on the basis 
of the function which the amount fulfils in the hands of the taxpayer is dependent upon the 
facts. 
Often, this factual determination is simply made (incorrectly, it is submitted) with reference 
to the mechanism used to formulate the quantum of the compensatory amount paid. For 
example, damages paid to a taxpayer for personal injury which meant that the taxpayer was 
unable to work could be either revenue or capital in nature depending upon whether the 
                                                   
74 The court says at 140: ‘What the parties intended, therefore, was a payment of a sum of money to 
restrain the appellant, for a period of two years, from earning income by the sale of all products 
competing …’. 
75 See ITC 1038 (1963) 26 SATC 123 at 129-131. 
76 See ITC 723 (1951) (supra note 68) at 498 where the court states: ‘It suffices to say that the 
appellant has not satisfied the Court … that the joint venture was not a venture entered into for the 
purpose of a profit-making scheme and that being so ... any sum which the appellant recovered by 
way of settlement of an action for damages brought against the builder for his breach of the joint 
venture is income and not capital.’ 
77 See ITC 1289 (1979) 41 SATC 149 at 152-153 where the court says: ‘The appellant had a reputation 
of being an outstanding sales promoter which, in my view, is the appellant's ability to earn income 
and is comparable to his ‘income-producing machine’. The tarnishing of his reputation is, therefore, 
of a capital nature in that his ability to earn income is diminished. The agreement not to sue is a 
restraint to claim compensation for his reduced capacity to earn income.’ 
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formulation of such damages was with reference to lost income or lost income earning 
potential. The function of said damages could be seen to act as compensation for lost income 
(and be revenue in nature) if simply calculated with reference to lost income, or as 
compensation for the taxpayer’s loss of his income earning potential (and capital in nature) 
if calculated with reference to the depreciation in value of his income earning machine. 
5.2.1.2. The nature of the amount which is lost and substituted 
The test in Burmah Steam Ship (1930), considering the function of the substituted amount, 
is however not always conclusive. In Estate A G Bourke v CIR (1991),78 Hoexter JA stated 
that ‘the fact that what is plugged is a hole in assets, does not by itself, conclude the 
inquiry’. It is also necessary to consider the actual nature in the hands of the taxpayer of 
that which is lost. 
The court refers to Broomberg’s Tax Strategy,79 where the author states as follows: 
‘Of course, it is not sufficient to establish that the compensation is being 
paid in order to fill a hole in the taxpayer’s assets. It is necessary, in 
addition, to ascertain the true nature of that asset in the recipient’s 
hands. More particularly, was the asset, prior to its destruction or 
damage, an asset of a capital nature or was it floating capital? If it was 
floating capital, such as trading stock, standing crops, or consumable 
stores (like petrol, oil and so forth) the compensation will, obviously, be 
of a revenue nature, and will be subject to tax. In short, it is only where 
the payment received is to fill a hole in the capital assets of the taxpayer 
that the payment will escape the tax net’ 
In the case of Estate A G Bourke v CIR (1991) the taxpayer was compensated, inter alia, for 
the destruction in a fire of pine trees grown as part of a timber plantation business which 
was being conducted. Applying the Burmah Steam Ship (1930) test of identifying the 
function fulfilled by the compensatory amount leads to the conclusion that the amount 
received was as compensation for the destruction of an asset (namely, the pine trees). 
Counsel for the taxpayer submitted that prior to their being felled, this asset formed part of 
the income providing structure of the taxpayer and the compensation received was therefore 
capital in nature. 
However, on the basis of the nature of the business carried on by the taxpayer in relation to 
these trees, the Appellate Division found that they formed part of the ‘floating capital’ of the 
                                                   
78 Supra note 67 at 93. 
79 2nd Edition (1983) at 199-200. 
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taxpayer’s business and the compensatory amount received in respect of their destruction 
was revenue in nature. Hoexter JA stated as follows: 
‘It is clear, in my opinion, that the pine trees on the property represented 
a trading asset of the trust ... that having regard to the essential nature 
of the business of the trust and the syndicate the pine trees on the 
property constituted trading stock as defined in s 1 of the Act’.80 
The principle applied was that the nature of the substituted amount was determined by the 
nature (in the hands of the taxpayer) of the asset replaced. 
The following instances further exhibit how the nature of that which is lost in the hands of 
the taxpayer can determine the tax nature of the substitute receipt: 
• Where a tangible asset is damaged or destroyed, recourse should be had to the 
nature of the profit which would have been made, had that asset been realised, in 
order to determine the capital or revenue nature of the compensation in the hands 
of the taxpayer. Where an intangible asset such as an agency agreement is cancelled, 
the nature of the compensation received is decided by the question of whether or not 
the contract formed a major part (though not necessarily the whole) of the structure 
of the taxpayer’s business. If so, the compensation is capital. If not, and the 
cancellation of the agreement doesn’t affect a major part of the business of the 
taxpayer, then the compensation could be seen to merely be for lost profit (and 
therefore revenue in nature).81 
• Where compensation is paid for the expropriation of rights, which expropriation 
amounted to the sterilisation of a capital asset, the compensation was viewed as 
capital in nature.82 
                                                   
80 Supra note 67 at 95. 
81 Broomberg on Tax Strategy, 5th edition (2012) at 247-248, and the reference to ITC 1557 (1992) 
55 SATC 218 where the tax court stated that ‘where the true nature of the transaction is that a 
company … is paid compensation for giving up, or closing down a particular branch of its business 
… the compensation is capital of nature. It matters not whether the business closed down is the 
whole, or a significant part of the business’. 
82 In CIR v Illovo Sugar Estates Ltd (1951) (supra note 69) the nature of the canefields in the 
economy of Illovo Sugar was such that they formed an essential part of the income producing 
machine, and the compensation for the loss thereof was capital in nature. Conversely, the nature of 
the sugarcane itself that was destroyed was trading stock in the hands of the taxpayer and the 
compensation in respect thereof was revenue in nature. 
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• In contrast, compensation paid to the lessor in substitution for the rental not 
received in terms of a rental agreement that was breached, was revenue in nature.83 
From the above, it becomes clear that the application of these guidelines as distinct from 
one another becomes somewhat of a matter of degree, which could, it is submitted, lead to 
uncertainty. 
5.2.2. Professional commentary on the insurance analogy argument 
In the first of his series of articles on the subject, Byala (1993) submits that: 
‘any receipt or accrual resulting from the hedging of a capital asset will 
itself be of a capital nature; for example, a put option to protect against 
the diminution in value of a long-term interest bearing investment’.84 
Byala (1993) sees this sort of hedging transaction as being akin to an insurance policy, and 
the determination of whether the receipt is capital or revenue in nature is dependent upon 
whether the proceeds received are designed to ‘fill a hole in income or in capital’. In the 
learned author’s view, provided there is a genuine hedging intention, ‘amounts received or 
accrued will be regarded as simply restoring a capital asset to its original value and thus 
not be subject to tax’.85 The case of Taeuber & Corssen (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1975) supra is cited 
as support for this statement. 
Hutton (1998:166) refers to the views of Byala (1993),86 and makes reference to the Burmah 
Steam Ship (1930) case as authority for the insurance analogy postulated. By way of further 
illustration of this argument Hutton (1998) then contrasts the following two South African 
tax cases: 
• In ITC 594 (1945) supra,87 where insurance proceeds were considered to be 
revenue in nature since they were recovered in respect of lost profits resulting 
from a fire, Ingram CJ (with reference to the Burmah Steam Ship (1930) case, 
amongst others) applied the idea that the compensatory amount received 
‘assumes the character of the accrual for which it is substituted’. 
                                                   
83 In ITC 312 (1934) 8 SATC 154 the court says at 156: ‘The contract was a contract of lease, and it 
seems to me that a lump sum paid in lieu of, or as compensation for, the balance of rent due for the 
period stipulated, is a sum paid under and by virtue of the letting of the property’. 
84 Byala, B. 1993. ‘Financial futures and options I’ Tax Planning 7(5):101-106 at 104. 
85 Ibid at 104. 
86 Hutton, S. 1998. ‘The Taxation of Derivatives in South Africa’ The Taxpayer 47:163-171. 
87 Supra note 70. 
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• The case of ITC 942 (1960)88 is then distinguished from ITC 594 (1945) supra. 
The proceeds of an insurance policy taken out by a company over the life of its 
director and shareholder were held to be capital in nature since the purpose of 
the policy was to preserve the income-making machine on the death of the 
insured (should the company owe a large sum of money on loan account to the 
deceased, which could lead to the company’s liquidation if any attempt was made 
by his executors to compel payment of this loan account at the time of his death). 
Whilst Brincker (2011) also makes reference to this insurance argument (questioning 
whether the taxpayer is filling a hole in profits or in the income earning structure) in order 
to determine the character of the proceeds realised from a derivative hedging transaction, 
he is of the view that this argument should be relegated. He states at 4.1.4 under the heading 
of ‘Hedging and quasi-insurance’ that: 
‘It is not correct to merely use the argument that a derivative should be 
seen to be similar to an insurance contract and, for that reason, that the 
proceeds arising from the derivative contract entered into as a hedge for 
an underlying capital asset should thus also be capital in nature’.89 
Brincker’s (2011) criticism is based on the idea that an insurance pay out for loss of profits 
would still be revenue in nature, or that continuous hedges could be seen as a profit making 
scheme (notwithstanding that they were ostensibly linked to an underlying capital asset). 
In Brincker’s (2011) view, the better argument to determine the character of the proceeds 
realised from a derivative hedging transaction should focus on the nature of the underlying 
asset. This is considered further in 5.3 below. 
5.3. The tax treatment of the derivative hedge should follow the tax 
treatment of the underlying asset 
5.3.1. Professional commentary on following the nature of the 
underlying asset 
Hutton (1998) states that: 
‘the character of the proceeds of a hedging transaction should follow the 
character of the underlying asset or exposed hedge’.90 
                                                   
88 24 SATC 446. 
89 Brincker, TE. 2011. Taxation Principles of Interest and other Financing Transactions. Issue 9. 
Chapter W – Derivative Instruments:W-8-2. 
90 Hutton (op cit note 86) at 167. 
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Hutton (1998) also places reliance on ITC 1498 (1989) and on the idea that gains made on 
derivatives should ‘assume the character of their originating cause’.91 In further support of 
this Hutton (1998) cites Caxton Limited (no 8386), an unreported decision of the Transvaal 
Income Tax Special Court in August 1988, where losses made on forward exchange 
contracts taken out in respect of the acquisition of a capital asset were held to be capital in 
nature (and therefore non-deductible), and ITC 340 (1935) where it was decided that gains 
made using forward exchange contracts to hedge the acquisition of trading stock were held 
to constitute taxable business profit..92 
The premise of this argument is therefore that the tax treatment of the derivative hedge 
should be analogous to the tax treatment of the underlying asset. 
Hutton (1998) is also of the view,93 rightly, it is submitted, that there is economic merit in 
linking the tax treatment of the underlying capital investment and the hedging instrument. 
To do otherwise would distort the efficacy of the hedge (were the hedging gains taxable and 
the underlying losses capital in nature and non-deductible). It is submitted that it could also 
prompt taxpayer’s to try and apply differential treatment to gains as opposed to losses, 
which could ultimately be unfair to both the taxpayer and the fiscus. 
Byala (1993) submits that the decision in ITC 1498 (1989) offers support for the notion that 
this argument can be extended to hedges of capital assets, albeit that the statement does not 
appear to be definitive, to the extent that: 
‘the South African courts have recognised that a hedging transaction 
may result in capital receipts or accruals’.94 
Both Byala (1993) and Hutton (1998) agree that the taxpayer must prove a genuine hedging 
intention before being able to claim that the character of the proceeds of a hedge follow the 
character of the underlying asset or exposure hedged.95 
                                                   
91 ITC 1498 (1989) (supra note 41) concluded that a gain made hedging the cost of acquisition of a 
capital asset was capital in nature. 
92 Hutton (op cit note 86) at 167-168 citing ITC 340 (1935) (supra note 39). 
93 Hutton (op cit note 86) at fn 16 on page 168. 
94 Byala (op cit note 84) at 105. 
95 Byala (op cit note 84) at 104-105 and Hutton (op cit note 86) at 168-169. The authors both suggest 
that in order to evidence such a genuine hedging intention something more than the mere ipse dixit 
of the taxpayer is required. Byala is of the view that the accounting guidelines for a hedge should be 
complied with. These entail that the hedge should form part of a non-trading portfolio; that the 
position hedged is specifically identifiable and exposes the enterprise to price risk; that the 
transaction is designated as a hedge; and that there is a high degree of correlation at inception (and 
on an ongoing basis) between the changes in value of the hedging instrument and the opposite 
changes in value of the hedged item. Hutton suggests that the taxpayer would need to show a match 
in the nature, extent and duration of the two transactions (the underlying transaction and the hedge) 
as well as the likely effectiveness of the hedge (by showing a high degree of correlation between 
changes in the value of the hedge and changes in the value of the underlying position). 
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Byala (1993) and Hutton (1998) note also that this idea is expressed in the SAICA report 
(1992), where it was concluded that: 
‘It would appear … that in appropriate circumstances it is possible for 
an investor in gilts or equities to use futures or options as effective 
hedges of capital assets on an after tax basis. Provided a sufficiently 
close link can be demonstrated between the underlying capital 
investment and the hedging instrument, it would appear that the 
hedging transaction is of a capital nature’.96 (emphasis added) 
Brincker (2011) also makes reference to ITC 340 (1935) and ITC 1498 (1989), but cautions 
in regards to ITC 340 (1935) that whilst the profits derived from the forward exchange 
contracts were held to be revenue in nature (because they were incidental to the normal 
business operations of the taxpayer), one should bear in mind that the court also found (on 
the facts) that the taxpayer had a definite intention to make a profit from the forward 
exchange contracts. In Brincker’s (2011) view, one should be careful to rely on ITC 340 
(1935) as authority for the idea that the hedging gain was revenue in nature purely because 
the underlying asset was trading stock being acquired. The taxpayer also had a separate 
profit motive.97 
Brincker (2011) also refers to ITC 1498 (1989) as the ‘first time that it was clearly indicated 
that a derivative should be categorised on the same basis as its originating cause’; however 
he clarifies that one should also be careful when relying on the decision in ITC 1498 (1989) 
as authority for the idea that the ‘hedging of a capital asset will always result in the 
proceeds of the derivative being deemed to be of a capital nature’.98 
At best, in Brincker’s (2011) view, ITC 1498 (1989) was decided in favour of the taxpayer 
because the court was of the view that the forward exchange contracts in question were not 
integral to the business of the taxpayer, and he submits that the real test should instead be 
an enquiry into: 
‘the intention of the taxpayer in hedging the underlying asset, and 
whether that intention is in itself of a capital nature, and is consistent 
with the holding of the underlying capital asset’.99 
                                                   
96 SAICA (op cit note 1) at 26. 
97 Ibid at W-8-1. 
98 Ibid at W-8-2. 
99 Ibid. Brincker equally points out at W-9 that the surrounding circumstances would need to support 
the taxpayer’s stated intention to hedge an underlying asset. Merely stating that a derivative 
instrument has been entered into in respect of such an asset is insufficient. To satisfy this burden of 
proof the taxpayer would need to show a sufficiently close link between the two. This determination 
would likely consider the correlation between the hedging instrument and the asset, the extent to 
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Brincker (2011) is also in support of the idea that the tax treatment of the underlying capital 
investment should be linked to the tax treatment of the hedging instrument in order to bring 
about tax neutrality.100 
Finally, Coetsee (1995) also appears to suggest that, on the basis that the taxpayer can prove 
his intention to protect a long term investment, the character of the proceeds of the hedge 
should follow the character of the underlying asset. Coetsee (1995) submits that, whilst not 
tested in court, the same principles as were applied in ITC 1498 (1989) should apply to 
derivatives entered into to hedge capital assets.101 
It would appear then that all of the authors noted above are of the view that the tax 
treatment of the derivative hedge should follow the (capital) tax treatment of the underlying 
asset, provided the requisite intention is evident. 
Byala (1993) and Hutton (1998) are of the view that there needs to be a ‘genuine hedging 
intention’ in respect of an underlying capital asset (demonstrated with reference to the 
accounting standards), whilst Coetsee (1995) requires a similar ‘intention to protect’ an 
underlying capital investment. Brincker (2011) phrases it differently – an enquiry into the 
capital intention in respect of the hedge as well as the hedged asset. Brincker (2011) 
requires a capital intention with both for the tax treatment of the derivative hedge to follow 
that of the underlying asset.102 
5.3.2. International comparisons 
In the absence of definitive precedent for the notion that the tax treatment of the derivative 
hedge should follow that of the underlying asset, it falls to consider whether comparable 
international precedent could provide support in this regard. 
The international jurisdictions discussed below provide useful examples of how the 
question of the taxation of a derivative hedge is dealt with elsewhere. The jurisdictions are 
chosen because they were all originally considered by both SAICA and the Sub-Committee 
of the Tax Advisory Committee when the questions around the taxation of derivatives 
hedges first arose.103 They are also considered to be useful comparative jurisdictions 
because they share common taxing principles with South Africa (i.e. they distinguish 
between capital and revenue and they have a capital gains tax), they have formal derivatives 
                                                   
which the hedge mitigates the risk perceived and the duration over which the two transactions were 
entered into. 
100 Ibid at W-9. 
101 Coetsee, D. 1995. The taxation of derivatives. Accountancy SA September 1995:11-13 at 11-12. 
102 The authors note that a court would not regard a taxpayer's ipse dixit as decisive in such an 
enquiry, but would instead examine all relevant facts and circumstances. 
103 See 3.3 of the SAICA report and 4.4 of the TAC consultative document. 
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exchanges (similar to the SAFEX) and they have issued some form of guidance on hedging 
transactions. 
5.3.2.1. United Kingdom 
In terms of Statement of Practice 03/2002 entitled ‘Tax Treatment of Transactions in 
Financial Futures and Options’, it is stated that: 
‘a financial futures … transaction which is clearly ancillary to a trading 
transaction on current account will give rise to trading profits or losses. 
In contrast, a financial futures … transaction which is clearly ancillary 
to a transaction which is not a trading transaction on current account 
will be capital’.104 (emphasis added) 
In order for a futures position to be classified as an ancillary (hedging) transaction for 
purposes of this Statement there must be, inter alia, another underlying transaction (or 
several other underlying transactions), the intention to ‘eliminate or reduce risk’ in respect 
of the underlying transaction(s) and the futures position must be ‘economically 
appropriate to the elimination or reduction of risk’. 
Determining whether a hedging transaction is ‘economically appropriate’ requires an 
enquiry into whether the hedge is, by virtue of the relationship between fluctuations in the 
price of the hedging instrument and fluctuations in the value of the underlying transaction, 
one which may reasonably be expected to be appropriate to be used to eliminate or reduce 
risk. 
As can be seen from the above, a derivatives hedge that appropriately eliminates risk (by 
virtue of the inverse relationship between fluctuations in the price of the hedging 
instrument and fluctuations in the value of the underlying) will be seen to be ancillary to the 
underlying transaction, and the tax treatment of the derivatives hedge will be determined 
with reference to the tax treatment of this underlying transaction. Importantly, this includes 
the situation where a capital asset is hedged.105 
                                                   
104 Paragraph 9 of Statement of Practice 03/2002 published by Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs on 
30 September 2002. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-
practice-3-2002/statement-of-practice-3-2002 [2015, June 21]. 
105 The Statement provides the following examples of futures hedging positions that would be capital 
in nature: a taxpayer holding gilts or a broadly based portfolio of UK equities selling gilt futures or 
FTSE 100 index futures to protect the value of its capital in the event of a fall in the value of gilt-
edged securities generally, or a fall in the market. Conversely, the Statement provides the example 
that a taxpayer’s futures transactions which are incidental to its trading activity (for example, a 
manufacturer entering into transactions to reduce the risk of fluctuations in the price of raw 
materials) would be revenue in nature and the profits and losses from these transactions would be 
taken into account as part of the profits and losses of the trade. 
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5.3.2.2. United States of America 
The tax treatment of hedging transactions was originally entirely a matter of case law. In 
the 1955 Supreme Court decision in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner,106 it was 
held that gains and losses on hedging transactions were revenue in nature which matched 
the character of the gain or loss to the hedged item. These gains and losses were made 
buying and selling commodities futures contracts and were revenue in nature because the 
derivative hedges formed a vital part of the taxpayers business, insuring it against 
fluctuations in corn prices which insulated it against increases in the cost of acquiring its 
trading stock.107 
The rationale applied was that since the hedging transactions formed an integral part of the 
business model used to acquire inventory, they fell (on a wide reading) within the stock-in-
trade exclusion in section 1221(a)(1) of the US Tax Code, and were not capital assets.108 
Despite this decision, in the 1993 Tax Court case of Federal National Mortgage Association 
v Commissioner for Internal Revenue109 the Inland Revenue Service submitted that the 
taxpayer was required to treat its losses incurred in hedging interest obligations to 
debenture holders as capital on the basis of a second 1988 Supreme Court decision in the 
case of Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner for Inland Revenue.110 The Tax Court 
disagreed however, permitting ordinary tax treatment for these hedging transactions 
entered into on the basis that the hedge was a ‘surrogate’ transaction of the underlying 
(revenue) obligation to pay interest.111 
                                                   
106 350 U.S. 46 (1955). Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/350/46/case.html 
[2016, January 5]. 
107 The underlying corn was utilised in the business to manufacture products such as syrups, sugars 
and oils. The sale of these products (under contracts requiring shipment in thirty days at a set price 
or at market price on the date of delivery, whichever was lower) meant that the taxpayer was 
particularly exposed to increases in corn prices. It is noted that these commodities futures were only 
partial hedges, against an increase in prices, since the sales model did not allow for hedging against 
a price decline. 
108 Regulation section 1.1221-1(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations states that the term ‘capital 
assets’ includes all classes of property not specifically excluded by US Code section 1221. Available: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/1.1221-1 [2016, January 5]. US Code section 1221(a)(1) 
excludes from capital assets all stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would 
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer. Available: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/1221 [2016, January 5]. 
109 100 T.C. 541 (1993). 
110 485 U.S. 212 (1988). The Supreme Court created doubt as to the interpretation of US Code 
section 1221 with this case, insofar as they applied a far more narrow reading than in the Corn 
Products Refining (1955) decision and held that the gain or loss on the sale or exchange of an asset 
was capital in nature unless the asset fell specifically within one of the enumerated exceptions in US 
Code section 1221. Available: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/485/212/ [2016, 
January 5]. 
111 Federal National Mortgage Association (1993) (supra note 109) at 579 where the court held that 
the ‘hedging transactions bear a close enough connection to its section 1221(4) mortgages to be 
excluded from the definition of capital asset’. 
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In 1994, new hedging regulations were issued in the form of US Code section 1221(a)(7), 
excluding these transactions from the ambit of capital assets.112 The primary purpose of 
these hedging character rules is to allow a taxpayer to match ordinary (revenue) gains and 
losses from the hedge with ordinary gains and losses from the hedged items, thereby 
avoiding character mismatches. 
To qualify for this hedging treatment, the taxpayer must satisfy two requirements. Firstly, 
the hedged item must be an ordinary asset (or borrowing), and the hedge must be entered 
into in the course of the taxpayer's normal trade or business to manage the risk of price 
change or currency fluctuations.113 Secondly, the hedge and hedged item must be properly 
and timeously identified.114 If both requirements are met, gains and losses on the hedge are 
revenue in nature. 
Both the Corn Products Refining and the Federal National Mortgage Association cases, as 
well as the subsequently added US Code section 1221(a)(7), therefore appear to support the 
contention that reference should be made to the tax treatment of the underlying position in 
order to determine the tax treatment of the hedging transaction. It is noted though that both 
the US Code and the cited cases only deal with revenue hedges. None of these are applied in 
the context of a capital gain made on a hedge. Presumably however the taxpayer would 
argue that a hedge not timeously designated as such, or a hedge not taken out in connection 
with a business, would be capital in nature (which could match the treatment of the 
underlying position). 
5.3.2.3. Australia 
In Australia, the tax authorities have stated the following regarding derivatives hedging: 
‘It is accepted, as a general rule, that the entering into futures 
transactions by a businessman may be regarded as an integral part of 
the business where the quantity of goods covered by the futures 
transactions corresponds by and large to the estimated production and 
where there is a subsequent sale of goods of the kind covered by the 
trading. Any profit or loss arising from the ‘closing-out’ of futures 
                                                   
112 US Tax Code section 1221(a)(7) specifically excludes from the definition of capital asset ‘any 
hedging transaction which is clearly identified as such before the close of the day on which it was 
acquired, originated, or entered into’. Available: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/1221 
[2016, January 5]. 
113 Regulation section 1.1221-2(b) of the Code of Federal Regulations. Available: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/26/1.1221-2 [2016, January 5]. 
114 US Tax Code section 1221(a)(7). 
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transactions is to be regarded as arising from the business and taken 
into account in determining the gross proceeds of the business’115 
The relevant ruling therefore specifies that, for a futures transaction to be regarded as a 
hedge in Australia, (i) the quantity of goods covered by the futures contract hedge needs to 
correspond to the estimated production; and (ii) there needs to be a subsequent sale of 
goods of the kind being hedged. The outcome of the underlying transaction is therefore a 
decisive factor in classifying the derivative position adopted as a hedge.116 The principle 
applied is that the taxation of the profit or loss realised on the derivatives hedge should 
follow the nature of the taxation applied to the underlying transaction. 
It should be borne in mind though that the relevant ruling appears to have been issued with 
mainly the treatment of commodity futures in mind.117 Furthermore, it also appears to be 
aimed at hedging in a business context since the gains or losses are not treated as capital in 
nature but are rather ‘taken into account in determining the gross proceeds of the business’ 
(i.e. revenue in nature).118 
It is therefore submitted that this guidance has little bearing on the hedging of a share 
investment and offers little help in this regard. 
 
                                                   
115 Tax Ruling IT 2228 – ‘The Taxation of Futures’, paragraphs 22-26, issued on 12 December 1985. 
Available: https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/document?docid=ITR/IT2228/NAT/ATO/00001 
[2015, December 18]. 
116 Refer to the SAICA report on page 15, and the TAC consultative document on page 64. 
117 The TAC consultative document on page 64. 
118 One could argue that this is not vastly dissimilar from the court’s reasoning in ITC 43 (1925) 
(supra note 37). 
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CHAPTER 6 COMMON LAW ‘FIRST PRINCIPLES’ RELEVANT FOR 




This chapter examines precedent from South African case law to identify certain common 
law ‘first principle’ guidelines laid down by our courts. 
It should be remembered that these are only guidelines (as opposed to absolute tests) for 
the determination of whether a receipt or accrual is capital or revenue in nature. The courts 
have oft recognised that there is no ‘simple and universally valid litmus test’,119 no ‘single, 
infallible test of invariable application’,120 in this regard.121 The question as to whether 
‘income falls on the one side of the ill-defined borderline between capital and revenue or 
on the other being “a matter of degree depending on the circumstances of the case”’.122 
The taxpayer therefore always bears the onus of proving that a particular amount is of a 
capital nature.123 To discharge this onus the taxpayer would need to establish his case on ‘a 
balance or a preponderance of probabilities’.124 
6.2. Intention 
In our jurisprudence on the determination of the income tax nature of a receipt or accrual, 
it is the subjective enquiry into the taxpayer’s intention that is often held up as conclusive 
‘unless some other factor intervened to show that when the article was sold it was sold in 
pursuance of a scheme of profit–making’.125 
                                                   
119 As per the words of Kriegler AJA in CIR v Guardian Assurance Co South Africa Ltd 1991 (3) SA 1 
(A) at 19. 
120 Per Smalberger JA in CIR v Pick n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust (1992) 54 SATC 271 at 
279. 
121 In the words of Southwood AJA in CSARS v Wyner (2003) 66 SATC 1 at para 7: ‘There is no single 
all-embracing test of universal application for determining whether a particular receipt is one of a 
revenue or capital nature’. 
122 Guardian Assurance Co (1991) (supra note 119). 
123 Section 102 of the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011. 
124 CIR v Middelman (1989) 52 SATC 323 at 325. 
125 The dicta of Wessels JA in CIR v Stott (1928) 3 SATC 253 at 262. 
38 
This is referred to as the ‘golden rule’ by certain authors,126 though it could equally be 
referred to as the ‘golden thread’ running through several of the guidelines outlined 
below.127 
This reference to the taxpayer’s subjective intention being conclusive does however require 
that the taxpayer’s evidence be tested against the objectively determinable facts 
surrounding the transaction in question.128 The ipse dixit of the taxpayer as to his intention 
or purpose should also not be ‘lightly regarded as decisive’129 since ‘it may be coloured by 
self-interest’.130 
6.2.1. The ‘Golden Rule’ 
The determination of whether the proceeds from the disposal of an asset are of a capital 
nature hinges on the intention with which that asset was initially acquired. Where it was 
acquired with the intention of holding a capital asset, the subsequent disposal is simply the 
realisation of such capital asset and the proceeds are capital in nature. 
According to the Appellate Division in Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v Sekretaris van 
Binnelandse Inkomste (1978) the sale of an asset acquired with a view to:131 
‘holding it either in a non-productive state or in order to derive income 
from the productive use thereof, and in fact so held, constitutes a 
realisation of fixed capital and the proceeds an accrual of a capital 
nature’.132 
6.2.2. Circumstantial indicators 
In Bloch v SIR (1980) it was said that: 
‘capital is that which is held with an element of permanency and with 
the object that it should produce an economic utility for the holder’.133 
Given that these characteristics can, to some extent, be objectively measured and since a 
taxpayer’s ipse dixit as to his subjective intention should not simply be accepted,134 a court 
                                                   
126 De Koker, AP and Williams, RC. Silke on South African Income Tax at 3.2 [2016, January 14]. The 
SARS Share Owners Guide refers to this at 3.2.1 as the ‘most important factor’. 
127 Refer for example to the determination of whether the taxpayer is conducting a business, carrying 
out a scheme of profit-making or disposing of fixed or floating capital. 
128 Malan v KBI (1983) 45 SATC 59 at 77. 
129 ITC 1185 (1972) 35 SATC 122 at 123. 
130 Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd v CSARS [2014] 4 All SA 179 (WCC) at 183. 
131 1978 (1) SA 101 (A), 39 SATC 163. 
132 Corbett JA in his dissenting judgement at 181. 
133 (1980) 42 SATC 7 at 18. 
134 ITC 1185 (1972) (supra note 129). 
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would likely look to test or confirm any stated capital intention against these objectively 
determinable indicators which may be gleaned from the surrounding circumstances. If the 
taxpayer’s evidence is not contradicted by these objective indicators (and there is no other 
reason to disbelieve his evidence), he will have discharged a significant portion (if not all) 
of the onus of proof which he bears.135 
6.2.2.1. Length of the holding period and the ‘for keeps’ test 
When determining capital or revenue, the courts have previously held that an indicative 
sign of a capital asset is that it is acquired: 
‘for better or for worse, or, relatively speaking, for ‘‘keeps’’ (i.e. only to 
be disposed of if some unusual, unexpected, or special circumstance, 
warranting or inducing disposal, supervened) which is the usual badge 
of a fixed, capital investment ...’.136 
Given the above, if the length of holding is however short and the reason for disposing is not 
something unforeseen or unexpected, it can cast doubt upon the stated intention that the 
asset in question was held (and disposed of) as a capital asset. 
If one has reference to the equivalent position in the United Kingdom, the HMRC ‘Business 
Income Manual’ No. 20310 also identifies the interval of time between purchase and sale as 
a ‘badge of trade’. A taxpayer who acquires an asset and holds it for many years is said to be 
in a stronger position to argue that it is a capital investment than someone who sells soon 
after acquisition. Similarly, an intention at the time of purchase to sell quickly suggests the 
idea of turning assets over for profit. Even where no such intention is admitted or 
demonstrated, the fact that a sale takes place after a short period of ownership creates an 
adverse inference.137 
Broomberg (1998) is however of the view that the intention not to hold an asset ‘for keeps’ 
is not, by itself, decisive.138 SARS has also acknowledged that the length of time that an asset 
is held can be an unreliable indicator of the capital or revenue nature of the proceeds from 
its disposal, stating that: 
‘While a lengthy holding period may be indicative of a capital intent, the 
period of holding is far less important than other factors such as the 
                                                   
135 CIR v Middelman (1989) (supra note 124) at 327. 
136 Trollip AJ in Barnato Holdings v SIR (1978) 40 SATC 75 at 91. 
137 Available: https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/business-income-manual/bim20310 
[2016, January 14]. The short period of ownership in Wisdom v Chamberlain (1969) (supra note 47) 
was a factor in favour of trading. 
138 Broomberg, EB. 1998. ‘Capital, Revenue, Intention, Motive and Contemplation’ Tax Planning 
12(3) at 71. 
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taxpayer’s intention in buying and selling the asset, and the manner in 
which the asset is dealt with.’139 
It is submitted that the length of time for which an asset is held is therefore not necessarily 
decisive in determining whether the proceeds arising on its realization are income or capital 
in nature.140 
6.2.2.2. Negligible or non-existent return 
Similarly, if the asset has either no, or a low, economic return then it can also cast doubt 
upon a stated capital intention, given that it is expected that a capital asset should be one 
which is held in order to produce an ‘economic utility’. 
An asset which generates a negligible return is often considered to (only) have been held in 
order to dispose of it at a profit (i.e. held with a revenue intention).141 
This is equally relevant where the asset does not produce any income (such as a futures 
contract).142 It is submitted however that the taxpayer’s intention (and purpose) must still 
be taken into account in this regard.143 As to a taxpayer’s purpose, it is submitted that where 
the purpose is not to carry on a trade but to save or safeguard an investment, the proceeds 
of the sale can still be capital in nature.144 
If one again has reference to the equivalent position in the United Kingdom, the HMRC 
‘Business Income Manual’ No. 20260 identifies assets which yield no income or so-called 
                                                   
139 SARS Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax, Issue 5, 2014 (the ‘CGT Guide’) at 17, citing the 
examples of Natal Estates (1975) (infra note 149, where land held for 50 years was trading stock) 
and ITC 1185 (1972) (supra note 129, where property held for 7 months was capital in nature). 
140 LHC Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1950) 17 SATC 125 at 134; CIR v Richmond Estates (Pty) 
Ltd (1956) 20 SATC 355 at 366. 
141 Yates Investments (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1956) 20 SATC 368 at 371/2. 
142 See the CGT Guide (supra note 139) at 15 and the examples of undeveloped land, Krugerrands or 
diamonds cited there. 
143 See the CGT Guide (supra note 139) at 24/5 and the cases cited there in relation to Krugerrands, 
where the emphasis is placed on both the intention of the taxpayer upon acquisition and the reason 
for the sale of the Krugerrands, notwithstanding the inference (created by their non-existent return) 
that these assets are only purchased for resale at a profit. 
144 See Wyner v Commissioner, SARS [2002] JOL 9457 (C) at 6: ‘In ITC 1283 41 SATC 36 a 
Portuguese resident of Angola fled to Namibia. Since he could not export currency, he bought coffee 
beans and exported these to Namibia. In this way he smuggled his capital out in coffee beans. When 
he converted the coffee beans into South African currency, he made a profit. The court held that his 
purpose was not to carry on a trade but to save as much as he could of his investments in Angola. 
Similarly, the appellant's purpose was not to carry on a trade but to safeguard her investment. The 
sale to her should be seen as a device for turning her inchoate title into one that was transmissible’. 
It is submitted that reference in the CGT Guide (supra note 139) at 15 to the proceeds in ITC 1283 
being held to be of a capital nature as the taxpayer’s intention was merely to salvage his capital and 
not to carry on a business is incorrect. 
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‘pride of possession’ as also bearing the ‘badge of trade’, and are considered to be ‘normally 
dealt in by way of trade’.145 
6.3. Scheme of profit-making 
6.3.1. The taxpayer’s ‘revenue’ intention 
In the section above, the taxpayer’s capital intention when acquiring an asset was said to be 
decisive in determining the capital nature of the profits realised on its disposal. 
Where the taxpayer’s subjective intention upon acquiring that asset is to sell it (usually at a 
profit), this intention is once again said to be decisive. This is described as a ‘scheme of 
profit-making’. 
The asset is in this instance said to be held on revenue account and the proceeds realised 
are revenue in nature and fall to be taxed as part of the gross income of the taxpayer. 
The Appellate Division describes a ‘scheme of profit-making’ as follows in Elandsheuwel 
Farming (1978): 
‘In its normal and most straightforward form (a profit-making scheme) 
connotes the acquisition of an asset for the purpose of reselling it at a 
profit. This profit is then the result of the productive turn-over of the 
capital represented by the asset and consequently falls into the category 
of income. The asset constitutes in effect the taxpayer’s stock-in-trade or 
floating capital’.146 
This notion of, upon acquisition, having an intention to dispose of the asset is mirrored in 
the income tax definition of ‘trading stock’, which refers inter alia to anything acquired for 
purposes of sale or exchange.147 
It is further possible that where an asset is initially acquired as a capital asset (with the 
requisite capital intention), but then subsequently disposed of in pursuance of a scheme of 
profit-making, the proceeds realised will again be classified as revenue in nature. This is 
referred to as a so called ‘change of intention’. 
                                                   
145 Available: https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/business-income-manual/bim20260 
[2016, January 14]. See also Wisdom v Chamberlain (1969) (supra note 47). The purchase of the 
silver ingots in this matter looked to the court more like an ‘an adventure in the nature of trade’ than 
an investment (and was taxed accordingly) because, inter alia, it was in the mind of the court (while 
it lay in a vault) otherwise useless to the taxpayer. 
146 Elandsheuwel Farming (1978) (supra note 131) at 180-181. 
147 Refer to the section 1 definition of ‘trading stock’ in the Act. 
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6.3.2. The taxpayer’s change of intention 
To determine whether there has been a change of intention in the intervening period since 
acquisition, one must consider whether the taxpayer, in disposing of the asset, intended to 
pursue a scheme of profit-making with the asset as his ‘stock-in-trade’. The mere decision 
to sell an asset of a capital nature does not convert that asset to one of an income nature 
otherwise ‘every taxpayer who decided to realise a fixed capital asset and then proceeded 
to do so would find himself having to pay tax on his profit’.148 
What must be considered in determining this intention on disposal are the activities of the 
taxpayer in relation to the asset and the light these activities throw on his ipse dixit as to his 
intention, in order to determine whether the taxpayer has crossed the proverbial Rubicon.149 
It is important to remember however that, as the Appellate Division stated in John Bell & 
Co v SIR (1976), a: 
‘mere change of intention to dispose of an asset hitherto held as capital 
does not per se subject the resultant profit to tax. Something more is 
required in order to metamorphose the character of the asset and so 
render its proceeds gross income. For example, the taxpayer must 
already be trading in the same or similar kinds of assets, or he then and 
there starts some trade or business or embarks on some scheme for 
selling such assets for profit, and, in either case, the asset in question is 
taken into or used as his stock – in – trade’.150 
This reference to something ‘more’ being required to metamorphose the character of the 
asset is described by the same court in a subsequent case as ‘something indicating that the 
disposal is in reality in pursuance of some trade or business or scheme for making 
profit’.151 For the learned judge in that instance this was indicated by the surrounding 
circumstances and the way in which the change of intention was manifested. 
It is therefore also required that one determine from the surrounding facts whether the 
taxpayer has undergone a change intention in respect of the asset in question. If, on review 
of these surrounding circumstances or the way in which the disposal is manifested or carried 
out, the alleged change of intention may be said to have occurred then the disposal will be 
                                                   
148 Elandsheuwel Farming (1978) (supra note 131) at 189. 
149 Natal Estates Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1975 (4) SA 177 (A) at 202/3. 
150 (1976) 38 SATC 87 at 103. 
151 Refer to the separate judgement of Trollip AR supporting the majority in Elandsheuwel Farming 
(1978) (supra note 131) at 177. 
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held to be on revenue account, because once again a scheme of profit-making is being 
pursued. 
6.3.3. Pursuance of a scheme of profit-making 
The relevant consideration in determining whether a profit-making scheme is being 
pursued can be phrased as follows: 
‘receipts or accruals bear the imprint of revenue if they are not 
fortuitous, but designedly sought for and worked for’.152 
For the majority of the Appellate Division bench in Pick n Pay Employee Share Purchase 
Trust (1992), the determination of whether these receipts or accruals bear the imprint of 
revenue (i.e. were designedly sought for and worked for) involved more than a simple 
objective assessment of the conduct of the taxpayer and whether this evidenced the 
conducting of a business. What was also required was a subjective assessment of the 
taxpayer’s objective, and whether this meant that the business was conducted as part of a 
scheme of profit-making.153 
In deciding on the subjective aspect of this enquiry, it should be noted that: 
‘a court of law is not concerned with that kind of subjective state of mind 
required for the purposes of the criminal law, but rather with the 
purpose for which the transaction was entered into’.154 
Smalberger JA describes the determination of the subjective element as follows in Pick n 
Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust (1992): 
‘The application of (the scheme of profit-making) test involves a 
consideration of the objectives of the taxpayer … and what its purpose, 
or if there was more than one, what its dominant purpose was’.155 
The emphasis in the subjective enquiry should therefore be placed on the question of 
whether the taxpayer’s purpose was to make a profit with the transaction, as opposed to 
emphasising what other possibilities the taxpayer foresaw and with which he reconciled 
                                                   
152 Pick n Pay (1992) (supra note 120) at 280. It was on this basis that the majority of the court ruled, 
at 281, that the gain in question was capital in nature. 
153 Pick n Pay (1992) (supra note 120) at 280. See also Olivier, L. 2012. ‘Capital versus Revenue: 
Some Guidance’. De Jure 45(1) at 173-175. 
154 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1975 (3) SA 652 (A), 37 SATC 87 at 669. 
155 Pick n Pay (1992) (supra note 120) at 280. 
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himself.156 Where more than one purpose exists, recourse must be made once again to the 
dominant purpose. 
In considering the presence or absence of this profit-making purpose, it is submitted that it 
is not sufficient for the taxpayer to merely hope for an eventual profit as an incidental by-
product of the pursuit of another objective, or to reconcile him- or herself with the 
possibility that a profit may arise.157 Only if a genuine purpose to make a profit exists, will 
the amount received be revenue in nature. It is further submitted that, once again, all 
relevant surrounding facts and circumstances must be considered to determine whether the 
taxpayer’s purpose is the pursuit of a scheme of profit-making. 
6.3.4. The intersection between ‘intention’ and ‘purpose’ 
6.3.4.1. ‘Mixed intentions’ and ‘dominant purpose’ 
If upon the acquisition of an asset, a taxpayer’s intentions may be said to be ‘mixed’ then 
the determination of the income tax nature of the proceeds requires one to ‘give effect to the 
dominant factor operating to induce him to effect the purchase’.158 
So in a situation where the taxpayer was found to have a dominant purpose upon acquiring 
an asset which is something other than a profit motive, the gain realised on the disposal of 
the asset was held to be capital in nature.159 
                                                   
156 Pick n Pay (1992) (supra note 120) at 281. 
157 The following from Pick n Pay (1992) (supra note 120) at 281 is relevant in this regard: ‘While 
they might have contemplated the possibility of profits, it was not the purpose of either the company 
in founding the Trust, or the trustees in conducting the affairs of the Trust, to carry on a profit-
making scheme. The sole purpose of acquiring, holding and selling the shares was to place them in 
the hands of eligible employees. The forfeiture provision was not intended to yield a profit. Its 
purpose was to deter unwanted resignations. A different conclusion might have been justified if the 
making of profits was inevitable. But this was not the case. The prospects of profits were highly 
problematical. They depended upon the degree of success achieved by the scheme. If it had operated 
to its full potential, and there had been no forfeitures, there would probably have been no profits. 
But even accepting that forfeitures were inevitable, whether they resulted in profits being made 
depended on when they occurred in relation to the date of acquisition of the shares and the state of 
the market at the time of forfeiture. And the overall profits would depend further on whether other 
purchases and sales resulted in profits or losses. There were thus a number of variables which could 
influence the profit factor. That profits were not inevitable is proved by the fact that in the 1985 
year of assessment the operation of the scheme showed a loss of R70 619. In my view, therefore, 
any receipts accruing to the Trust were not intended or worked for, but purely fortuitous in the 
sense of being an incidental by-product. They were therefore non-revenue’. 
158 See in this regard for example COT v Levy (1952) 18 SATC 127 and CIR v Paul (1956) 21 SATC 1. 
159 CIR v Middelman (1989) (supra note 124) at 329. The dominant and overriding purpose of the 
taxpayer’s share dealings in this instance was to secure the highest dividend income attainable, and 
consequently the disposal of such shares was held to be on capital account. In COT v Levy (1952) 
(supra note 158) at 135/6 the court found in favour of the taxpayer’s claim that the gain realised was 
capital in nature, notwithstanding that it was accepted that the taxpayer had in mind when he 
purchased the shares in question that they would appreciate in value. This was on the basis that his 
dominant purpose in acquiring the shares was to obtain a good revenue from them. The court was 
satisfied that this was borne out by the fact that he had already decided at the time of acquisition to 
develop the property of the company in order to obtain a better return from it. In CIR v Paul (1956) 
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To determine whether a particular purpose is ‘dominant’ may be difficult.160 An objective 
will be seen to be the ‘dominant purpose’ if all the other alternative objective(s) present are 
entirely secondary, and, though contemplated, do not materially persuade the taxpayer to 
act.161 When acquiring an asset however a taxpayer is not required to ‘exclude the slightest 
contemplation of a profitable resale of the asset’.162 
When determining if a purpose is ‘dominant’, in the sense that all other are secondary, our 
courts have also stated the following however: 
‘Whether or not a purpose is dominant in the sense that another co-
existing purpose may be effected at a profit without attracting liability 
for tax, is a matter of degree depending on the circumstances of the case. 
A purpose may be a main purpose without being dominant in this sense. 
I shall not attempt a precise definition of the distinction, but there would, 
I consider, be such a main purpose where there is a further purpose 
simultaneously pursued by way of an additional, albeit subsidiary 
activity calculated and intended to yield a profit.’163 
Put differently, where a taxpayer has more than one co-existing purpose, his ‘main purpose’ 
(even if it is, for example, to hold the asset as capital) may not be his dominant purpose (and 
thereby determine the income tax nature of any proceeds upon a disposal) where his other 
purpose is aimed at the pursuit of activities that are intended to be profitable (even if such 
other contemporaneous activities pursued are subsidiary to his ‘main purpose’).164 
This sentiment is echoed by Broomberg (1998): while he agrees that an ‘intention to buy 
and resell is not enough to determine the nature of the proceeds … if there was a purpose 
to be served which is not concerned with whether or not a profit would be made’, he does 
                                                   
(supra note 158) at 9, citing the Levy case, the court found that the taxpayer had acquired the 
property in question as a capital investment, even though he contemplated disposing of the surplus 
land acquired (over and above his own requirements) to best advantage. This contemplation was as 
a result of the fact that the seller of the land in question refused to sell unless the whole property of 
167 acres was purchased by the taxpayer, and because the taxpayer in turn, unable to finance such a 
large purchase, needed to sell the balance of the land purchased to finance the deal. On the basis 
however that his dominant purpose was to obtain for himself a smallholding, not to make a profit 
from the sale of surplus land, the taxpayer was seen to have acquired the property in question as a 
capital investment. 
160 Bloch v SIR (1980) (supra note 133) at 14. 
161 De Koker Silke (op cit note 126) at 3.4 [2016, January 14]. 
162 Secretary for Inland Revenue v The Trust Bank of Africa Ltd (1975) 37 SATC 87 at 107. In the 
words of the court: ‘No one, however, readily buys property if he expects that he will eventually 
have to sell it at a loss’. 
163 African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1969) 31 SATC 163 at 175. 
164 See also in this regard 3.2.3 of the SARS Share Owners Guide where it is stated that: ‘A profit will 
be of a revenue nature when you have a secondary or alternative purpose of making a profit’, with 
reference to CIR v Nussbaum (1996) 58 SATC 283 at 291. 
46 
acknowledge that if a profitable resale was contemplated it makes the taxpayer’s task of 
proving that there is no scheme of profit-making more difficult.165 
6.3.4.2. Applying the taxpayer’s ‘purpose’ 
Our courts have previously relied upon a taxpayer’s purpose in the determination of the 
capital nature of the proceeds on the disposal of an asset, notwithstanding the taxpayer’s 
intention upon acquisition of the asset.166 
In the case of Berea West Estates (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1976),167 a so called ‘realisation company’ 
was incorporated in order to acquire thirteen beneficiaries’ undivided half share in the 
property of their deceased father’s estate, as well as to acquire the undivided half share of 
the property which the deceased had donated to an inter vivos trust on their behalf. This 
company was then to facilitate the disposal of this property (which was otherwise proving 
difficult to achieve) and to effect a proportional distribution of the net profits amongst the 
shareholders (who were the relevant beneficiaries of the trust and the estate).168 
Holmes JA held that the court was entitled, when considering whether the company was a 
realisation company or carrying on business of trading for profit, to look at the facts leading 
up to its incorporation and to its memorandum and articles.169 
On this basis, the court decided that the company was a realisation company because its 
purpose was solely to facilitate the realisation of the property to best advantage on behalf of 
the beneficiaries and to ensure the exclusive distribution of the proceeds amongst such 
beneficiaries. The company was simply the means whereby and through which the interests 
of its shareholders were properly realised.170 Consequently, the profit realised was capital in 
nature despite the intention of the company to acquire the property in question for the 
purposes of resale.171 
                                                   
165 Broomberg (op cit note 138) at 71. 
166 See also SAICA (op cit note 1 at 24-25) where it is submitted that the identification of a capital 
profit should not be done with reference to intention but that instead the motive test should prevail. 
167 1976 (2) SA 614 (A). 
168 Ibid at 50-51. 
169 Ibid at 61. 
170 Ibid. 
171 In Malone Trust v SIR 1977 (2) SA 819 (A) the appellate division again decided in favour of the 
taxpayer and held that the proceeds from the realisation of the land by the trust in question were 
capital in nature, notwithstanding that the trust acquired the land from the deceased Mr Malone’s 
estate in order to (i.e. with the intention of) having it sold. The court’s decision was again based on 
the purpose for setting up the trust – in this instance this was in order to ensure not only that the 
land was realised to best advantage, but also to protect the interests of the deceased’s children by 
ensuring that the proceeds were not dissipated by the deceased’s estranged spouse. See also ITC 1223 
(1974) (supra note 44) at 28/29, where despite the fact that the taxpayer company (originally set up 
as a family investment vehicle) disposed of all of its share investments within one year of their 
acquisition at a profit, the court emphasised that the taxpayer’s purpose in acquiring the investments 
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More recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal has refined this approach to the application of 
purpose in the determination of the capital or revenue nature of proceeds derived on the 
disposal of an asset, in the case of CSARS v Founders Hill (Pty) Ltd (2011).172 
The court was of the view that where an asset is transferred to another taxpayer so that that 
taxpayer might realise that asset (i.e. the taxpayer acquires with the intention to dispose), 
the proceeds from such realisation would only be capital in nature where there was a ‘real 
justification’ (in addition to the purpose of realising the asset) for the transfer to (and 
interposition of) the new taxpayer.173 
The court concluded that where such a real justification exists, the realisation of the 
property was not the main purpose of the interposition.174 Since the taxpayer in Founders 
Hill (2011) had no such real justification, its main purpose was considered to be the 
realisation of the property which amounted to the operation of a business in a scheme of 
profit-making. The proceeds of the disposal were therefore held to be revenue in nature. 
The implication remains that where a taxpayer acquires an asset with the intention to 
dispose of it, but for good reason the taxpayer’s main or dominant purpose can be said to 
be something other than the realisation of that asset, the proceeds of its disposal can still be 
capital in nature. 
6.3.4.3. The difference between intention and purpose 
The taxpayer’s intention on acquisition of an asset is often held up as conclusive.175 
Similarly, a profit-making scheme is only said to exist where the taxpayer’s purpose was to 
make a profit.176 Given the importance of these terms, the variable use thereof and the lack 
of judicial definition is unfortunate.177 
                                                   
was to acquire and hold a long term investment, and moreover its purpose in disposing of the shares 
was in order to protect its capital and not as part of a profit-making scheme. 
172 (2011) 73 SATC 183. 
173 Founders Hill (2011) (supra note 172) at paragraph 49. In the case of Berea West Estates (1976) 
(supra note 167) this real justification was the joint ownership of the property which made the 
realisation difficult. In the case of Malone Trust (1977) (supra note 171) this real justification was the 
need to protect the proceeds from dissipation by the estranged spouse. 
174 Founders Hill (2011) (supra note 172) at paragraph 53. 
175 Stott (1928) (supra note 125). 
176 Pick n Pay (1992) (supra note 120) at 280. 
177 The Appellate Division has previously said: ‘Contemplation is not to be confused with intention 
…. In a tax case one is not concerned with what possibilities, apart from his actual purpose, the 
taxpayer foresaw and with which he reconciled himself. One is solely concerned with his object, his 
aim, his actual purpose’. Refer Pick n Pay (1992) (supra note 120) at 281. See also ITC 1185 (1972) 
(supra note 129) where Miller J states the following: ‘It is the function of the court to determine on 
an objective review of all the relevant facts and circumstances what the motive, purpose and 
intention of the taxpayer were’. See also Nienaber JA in CSARS v NWK 2011 (2) SA 67 (SCA) at 
para 51, with reference to Hippo Quarries (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley 1992 (1) SA 867 (A) at 877, where 
the court confirms that both ‘motive’ and ‘purpose’ differ from ‘intention’. 
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The Oxford Dictionary of English defines the concept of intention as ‘the aim or plan; the 
conceptions formed by directing the mind towards an object’.178 Purpose is defined as the 
‘reason for which something is done’.179 Similarly, De Koker (2016) describes intention as: 
‘the direction of the mind to an object or resolution and must not be confused with mere 
contemplation’.180 In regards to purpose, the authors note: ‘Purpose is of central 
importance in the context of a ‘scheme of profit-making’ – it signifies the object … that the 
taxpayer had in mind’. 
Whilst South African jurisprudence has not (yet) attempted to place definitions on these 
terms, the courts in New Zealand have described a taxpayer’s purpose as being: 
‘… the object which he has in view or in mind … in ordinary language 
purpose connotes something added to intention and the two words are 
not ordinarily regarded as synonymous’.181 
A taxpayer’s intention could therefore be said to be the plan which he formulates when he 
applies his mind to the achievement of his purpose. His purpose in turn would be the object 
which he had in mind or, put differently, the reason behind his formulated intention. 
It is submitted that referring to a taxpayer’s purpose with the acquisition and/or disposal 
of an asset (in other words, his reason for acquiring or disposing of the asset) in order to 
characterise the nature of the proceeds received could result in a more equitable application 
of the taxation laws, as opposed to solely concentrating on his intention (which might be 
described as his plan for the asset, in order to achieve his purpose). This would align closely 
with the determination of whether the taxpayer has entered into a profit-making scheme, 
                                                   
178 ‘Intention’, Oxford Dictionary of English, 2005 2nd Edition revised, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. Black’s Law Dictionary, 2007 8th Edition defines ‘intention’ as ‘the willingness to bring about 
something planned or foreseen; the state of being set to do something’. Similarly, ‘intent’ is the 
‘mental resolution or determination to act’. 
179 Definition of ‘purpose’ in the Oxford Dictionary of English (supra note 178). Black’s Law 
Dictionary (supra note 178) defines ‘purpose’ as ‘an objective, goal or end’. 
180 De Koker Silke (op cit note 126) [2016, January 20]. 
181 De Koker Silke (op cit note 126)) [2016, January 20] citing Plimmer v CIR (1958) NZLR 147 where 
the taxpayer, in order to acquire ordinary shares in a company, was also required to purchase certain 
preference shares in issue. Since these were unwanted, it was the taxpayer’s intention (upon 
acquisition) to dispose of these preference shares as soon as possible. Notwithstanding this intention, 
the court ruled that the preference shares were not acquired for the purpose of selling them (rather 
only because he could not acquire the ordinary shares without acquiring the preference shares). In 
this regard, Plimmer’s case is not vastly dissimilar to CIR v Paul (1956) (supra note 158). See also 
SAICA Integritax 1421 Purpose, Intention, Object and Motive (Issue 83, July 2006). Available: 
https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2006/1421_Purpose_intention_object_and_motive.html. 
[2015, January 20]. In the more recent decision of Wellington Regional Stadium Trust v Attorney-
General (2005) 1 NZLR 267 (also referred to in the Integritax article cited above), a New Zealand 
court found that a charitable trust established to raise loan funding for the construction of a new 
sports stadium (which also then raised additional funds for the maintenance of the stadium through 
the sale of memberships, corporate boxes, naming rights, signage and sponsorships), did not trade 
with the purpose of making a profit since its profit objective was limited to making sufficient profits 
to meet its financial commitments. 
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which also requires an investigation into the taxpayer’s purpose (i.e. whether it is to make 
a profit) in order to render the proceeds received subject to tax on income account.182 
6.4. Further common law guidelines 
6.4.1. Originating cause 
The originating cause for a receipt relates to the work or activity which a taxpayer performs 
in order to receive an amount. It can be said to be the quid pro quo which the taxpayer gives 
for the receipt.183 This can include: 
‘a business which he carries on, or an enterprise which he undertakes, or 
an activity in which he engages and it may take the form of personal 
exertion, mental or physical, or it may take the form of employment of 
capital either by using it to earn income or by letting its use to someone 
else. Often the work is some combination of these’.184 
This reference to an ‘originating cause’ was originally coined by Watermeyer CJ in the Lever 
Bros (1946) case in the context of an investigation into the source of a receipt or accrual. It 
was however subsequently referred to by our courts as a guideline for the determination of 
the capital or revenue nature of a receipt for tax purposes by considering the nature of the 
source. Corbett AJ put it as follows in Tuck v CIR (1988): 
‘In a case such as the present, however, it seems to me that most 
problems of characterisation could appropriately be dealt with by 
applying the simple test indicated by Watermeyer CJ in the passage 
quoted from his judgment in the Lever Bros case viz by asking what 
work, if any, did the taxpayer do in order to earn the receipt in question, 
what was the quid pro quo which he gave for the receipt?’.185 
A receipt or accrual generated by a taxpayer through the carrying on of a business, through 
his or her own physical or mental exertion or through the employment of his or her capital 
                                                   
182 As set out by the Appellate Division in Pick n Pay (1992) (supra note 120) at 280. 
183 CIR v Lever Bros and Unilever Ltd (1946) 14 SATC 1 at 18-9: ‘the source of receipts, received as 
income, is not the quarter whence they come, but the originating cause of their being received as 
income … this originating cause is the work which the taxpayer does to earn them, the quid pro quo 
which he gives in return for which he receives them’. 
184 Ibid. 
185 (1988) 50 SATC 98 at 113. In CSARS v McRae (2001) 64 SATC 1 at 6-7 the court explained this 
consideration of the nature of the source as follows: ‘The court found on the facts of Tuck’s case that 
the quid pro quo given by the employer had two main elements. Firstly, there was an element of 
service given to the company … which element was of a revenue nature. Secondly there was an 
element of restraint of trade, which required the employee to refrain from competing with his 
employer as a prerequisite for receiving shares. The restraint of trade element was of a capital 
nature’. 
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can therefore ostensibly be considered to be revenue in nature because of the revenue nature 
of the quid pro quo given.186 It is respectfully submitted however that the ‘simple test’ to 
which Corbett JA refers is in reality nothing more than a composite of pre-existing 
guidelines for the determination of the capital or revenue nature of a receipt (the operation 
of a business guideline and the productive employment of capital guideline, which includes 
the application of a taxpayer’s own capital in the form of his or her skill or labour) that had 
already long since been settled in their own right by the time judgement was given in Tuck’s 
case.187 
6.4.2. Capital productively employed 
One of the oldest guidelines formulated for the determination of whether an amount was 
income or capital in nature comes from Wessels JA in COT v Booysens Estates Ltd (1918): 
‘Income is, as a rule, revenue derived from capital productively 
employed’.188 
The learned judge then went on to elucidate in this paragraph that this guideline relates to 
profit derived from ‘a thing’, without ‘the thing’ changing owners, which should be 
considered income rather than capital. 
The foundation of this guideline is therefore the question of whether there has been a 
productive utilisation of the capital of the taxpayer,189 without, it is submitted, a disposal of 
that capital by the taxpayer.190 This objectively determinable act would then have as a 
                                                   
186 See in this regard CIR v King (1947) 14 SATC 184 at 194 where Watermeyer CJ says ‘income, in 
the ordinary sense of the word, is the product or fruit of a man’s labour or of his capital or of both’ 
and before that CIR v Visser (1937) 8 SATC 271 at 277 where Maritz J had previously indicated that 
‘Income may also be described as the product of a man’s wits and energy’. 
187 It is also noted that Meyerowitz is of the view that it is the nature of the underlying transaction as 
opposed to the nature of the quid pro quo that determines the character of a receipt. He states as 
follows in Meyerowitz on Income Tax 2007-2008 at paragraph 8.11: ‘only an enquiry into the object 
(origin and end) of the receipts or accruals in question is capable of ascertaining the capital or 
revenue nature. In other words, it is not so much the nature of the quid pro quo for the receipt or 
accrual as rather the nature of the transaction from which the receipt or accrual flows to which one 
must resort when determining the issue’. 
188 (1918) 32 SATC 10 at 15. This position was then supported by Innes CJ in the Appellate Division 
judgement in this case (at 25) where he stated: ‘Profit or gain may be made in many ways; men 
may earn it by their labour, by their wits, by their capital. Many of the forms of profit specified in 
the definition are the product of skill or labour; but, speaking generally, profit otherwise derived 
must be in whole or in part of the product of capital if it is to be of the nature of income, and thus 
included in the definition’. 
189 Including his or her own ‘capital’, in the form of the taxpayer’s personal skills or labour. Any 
remuneration for a taxpayer for the application of this personal capital would be revenue in nature. 
See for example Broomberg (op cit note 81) at 51 where the learned author says: ‘the income of a 
professional practice is, inherently, the fruits of the labour of the professional practitioner, the 
products of his skill, wit, intellect and so forth’. 
190 To the extent that there are separate guidelines which have been developed to determine the 
income tax nature of a receipt arising from the disposal of an asset, it is submitted that the productive 
employment of capital guideline is focused on the classification of receipts or accruals arising from 
the utilisation of capital otherwise than by way of disposal. In ITC 598 (1945) 14 SATC 267 at 268 the 
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consequence the receipt or accrual of an amount, which amount would, accordingly, be 
treated as income for tax purposes. 
What makes this guideline useful, is that it is based solely upon whether or not an objectively 
determinable act has been performed by the taxpayer with his or her capital,191 and 
furthermore whether there is a direct causal connection between the receipt in question and 
the act performed sufficient to say that the act gave rise to the receipt. 
By way of example, a taxpayer would be said to productively employ his or her capital 
without disposing of it where he or she provided the use thereof to another in exchange for 
a return. This could be through the provision of a loan; the letting of immovable property; 
or the licensing of intellectual property. The interest, rental and royalty returns generated 
would in these cases be considered to be an income in nature.192 An investment by a taxpayer 
into shares would equally constitute a capital productively employed by reason of the fact 
that this too delivers a return.193 
6.4.3. ‘Fruit’ vs ‘tree’ analogy 
The reference in income tax to the ‘fruit’ and the ‘tree’ is a reference to a metaphor which is 
sometimes used as an indicator of capital productively employed. 
In CIR v Visser (1937) this was explained as follows: 
‘Income is what capital produces, or is something in the nature of 
interest or fruit as opposed to principal or tree’.194 
The courts will therefore, in determining the tax character of a receipt or accrual, seek to 
identify whether the amount represents the ‘fruit’ (i.e. the return) derived from a ‘tree’ (i.e. 
an income-producing asset), in which case the receipt or accrual is of a revenue nature (in 
                                                   
court put this as follows: ‘As a broad proposition it may be stated that income is revenue derived 
from capital productively employed. … This is a concise statement of the proposition that the fruits 
derived from invested capital are income. Such revenue-producing capital may, however, be 
realised, and realised at a profit. The question may then arise, is the amount realised merely an 
enhancement of the original capital or is the resultant profit a profit on revenue account’. 
191 The subjective intention of the taxpayer is not relevant, merely the question as to whether the 
receipt is the result of the productive utilisation of the taxpayer’s capital. 
192 Refer to Silke (op cit note 126) at 3.1: ‘often the determination whether a receipt or an accrual is 
of an income or a capital nature will be obvious. Thus amounts received by a taxpayer for allowing 
the use of an asset to some other person … interest, rents, royalties, all partake of the nature of 
income and fall within the definition of gross income. As long as the amount is received for the right 
of use of an asset without any change in ownership of the asset, it is in the nature of income’. 
Available: 
http://classic.mylexisnexis.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll/7b/ae/vaa/f2nk?f=templates$fn=default.htm$vi
d=mylnb:10.1048/enu [2016, January 14]. 
193 Refer also to Meyerowitz (op cit note 187) at 8.142: ‘In the case of civil fruits there is a receipt or 
accrual when the rents, interest or dividends become due and payable. When they are received or 
accrue they will be income, being the wealth produced by the capital productively employed’. 
194 CIR v Visser (1937) (supra note 186) at 276. 
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other words the result of capital productively employed). Where however the receipt or 
accrual is as a result of the disposal of the tree itself, the amount would in the ordinary 
course be of a capital nature. 
Maritz J cautions in CIR v Visser (1937) however that the application of this guideline is 
often difficult given that what is ‘tree’ in one taxpayer’s hands may be ‘fruit’ for another.195 
The distinction which the learned judge was making is equally applicable when one 
considers the difference between ‘fixed’ and ‘floating’ capital, which we shall consider in the 
next section. The disposal of an income-producing asset (which would be a ‘tree’) could very 
well still give rise to a revenue receipt for the taxpayer (similar to a ‘fruit’) if the nature of 
that income-producing asset was ‘floating capital’ (i.e. trading stock) in the taxpayer’s 
hands.196 
6.4.4. ‘Fixed’ vs ‘floating’ capital 
When characterising a receipt or accrual on the basis of the economic distinction (in relation 
to the carrying on of a business) between ‘fixed capital’ and ‘floating capital’, the following 
description is appropriate: 
‘Capital, it should be remembered, may be either fixed or floating. I take 
the substantial difference to be that floating capital is consumed or 
disappears in the very process of production, while fixed capital does 
not; though it produces fresh wealth, it remains intact.’197 
In short, the receipt from a disposal of fixed capital is capital in nature.198 Conversely, the 
receipt from a disposal of floating capital is revenue in nature. Assets that are fixed capital 
would, per the definition above, be classified objectively on the basis that they represent the 
employment of capital which is not consumed through the carrying on of a business but 
rather retain their nature permanently whilst deriving a return. Floating capital by contrast 
would be identifiable because it is consumed in the carrying on of a business, and changes 
form continually (from stock to cash and back into new stock). 
Although this distinction has been acknowledged by the courts, it does not appear to have 
been a very ‘fruitful test for the characterization of a particular asset as being either of an 
                                                   
195 See CIR v Visser (1937) (supra note 186) where the following illustration of this point is given: 
‘Law books in the hands of a lawyer are a capital asset; in the hands of a bookseller they are a trade 
asset’. 
196 This is explained as follows in CSARS v Van Blerk (2000) 62 SATC 131 at 135: ‘The proceeds of 
the sale are not to be determined by whether the fruits or corpus has been sold but rather by means 
of examination of the nature of the transactions and the intention with which they were 
undertaken’. 
197 Innes CJ in CIR v George Forest Timber Co Ltd 1924 AD 516 at 524. 
198 Assuming it is simply the realisation of a capital asset to best advantage. 
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income or of a capital nature’.199 This guideline is in reality seldom used, with reference 
instead being made to the intention with which the asset was acquired and held (and 
disposed of) by the taxpayer.200 It may perhaps therefore be more apt to refer to the concepts 
of ‘fixed’ and ‘floating’ capital as indicative factors to be taken into account in the 
determination of this intention, than as a guideline in their own right. 
The words of Smalberger JA in Pick n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust (1992) should 
also be remembered: 
‘Where no trade is conducted there cannot be floating capital’.201 
This guideline is therefore only relevant where a taxpayer needing to classify the income tax 
nature of a receipt is engaged in the operation of a business. 
6.4.5. Operation of business 
This guideline is well established, and has been considered numerous times in South African 
jurisprudence over the years. As a basic premise, where a receipt or accrual is: 
‘“a gain made by an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for 
profit-making,” then it is revenue derived from capital productively 
employed and must be income’.202 
In Stephan v CIR (1919),203 Mason J approved the following definition of ‘business’ as being 
‘anything which occupies the time and attention of a man for the purpose of profit’.204 It is 
therefore necessary to consider whether, on an objective assessment, the transactions 
carried out (giving rise to the gain in question) in fact amount to the operation of a business. 
It is also however necessary to consider the subjective element, in terms of which it should 
be decided on the basis of all the relevant facts and circumstances whether the taxpayer has 
carried out that business with the requisite profit motive.205 
                                                   
199 De Koker Silke (op cit note 126) at 3.14 [2016, January 20]. 
200 The question being whether it was acquired with the subjective intention to hold for a return, or 
to sell for a profit. 
201 Pick n Pay (1992) (supra note 120) at 283 with reference to Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 
v Aveling 1978 (1) SA 862 (A) at 880-881. 
202 The Scottish case of Californian Copper Syndicate v Inland Revenue (1904) 41 Sc LR 691 at 694, 
cited with approval in, inter alia, Overseas Trust Corporation Ltd v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue 1926 AD 444 at 453 and Stott (1928) (supra note 125) at 257. See also the recognition of 
this guideline in the words of Maasdorp JA in COT v Booysen’s Estates (1918) (supra note 188): ‘the 
transaction is not one in the course of business of a person who deals in land…, and the profit made 
is not income’. 
203 (1919) 32 SATC 54 at 61. 
204 Citing Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch.D. 258. 
205 See for example the comments in Crowe v CIR (1930) 4 SATC 133 at 139 to the effect that in COT 
v Booysens (1918) (supra note 188) ‘the Chief Justice applied the test of purpose or intention’. 
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The objective assessment requires one to take cognisance of the fact that the operation of a 
business may require, in the case of an individual, an element of ‘continuity’,206 and that the 
transactions performed are ones regularly and continually carried out in the operation of 
that business. It is also possible, and should be noted, that while a taxpayer may ostensibly 
acquire and dispose of an asset for a ‘secondary’ purpose, the transaction could still be 
considered to be part of the operation of the business and fall to be taxed on revenue 
account.207 
The frequency with which a taxpayer transacts may assist with the determination of whether 
a receipt is capital or revenue in nature. If the taxpayer buys and sells frequently, this can 
be seen to be an indicator of a business and a revenue intention.208 However, an isolated 
transaction outside of the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s business is not ipso facto capital 
in nature.209 The test remains an investigation into the intention or motive behind the 
transaction and whether there is a scheme of profit-making involved.210 The scale and 
frequency with which transactions are effected should not therefore be seen to be 
conclusive. They can however be an important indicator in showing whether a taxpayer has 
a revenue intention.211 
The subjective assessment requires that, notwithstanding whether a taxpayer is seen to be 
objectively carrying on a business, the receipts or accruals derived will only be revenue in 
nature if this business was conducted with ‘a profit-making purpose, as part of a profit-
making venture or scheme’.212 
                                                   
206 Refer to CIR v Lydenburg Platinum Ltd (1929) 4 SATC 8 at 16-17 where Stratford JA stated that: 
‘continuity … is a necessary element in the carrying on of a business in the case of an individual but 
not of a company’. 
207 Refer to African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR (1969) (supra note 163) at 176: 
‘Where the sale of shares held as an investment is in fact contemplated as an alternative method of 
dealing with them for the purpose of making a profit…or … where it is one of the appointed means 
of a company’s gains…that is a secondary … purpose of their acquisition… It would nevertheless be 
part of the business operations contemplated for the production of income’. See also CIR v 
Nussbaum (1996) (supra note 164) for another example of a ‘secondary profit-making purpose’. 
208 Refer however to Stephan v CIR (1919) (supra note 203) at 59 where a single salvage transaction 
was held to be taxable because of the apparent profit-making motive. The court stated that: ‘The 
whole thing was an adventure or concern of the nature of a business or trade; the profits arising 
therefrom come within the very words of the definition of income, and arise from the productive 
use of capital employed to earn them’. 
209 See for example ITC 43 (1925) (supra note 37) where a speculation in futures was taxed on 
revenue account despite being an isolated transaction. The court held that, although different to the 
transactions ordinarily undertaken this speculation was still within the scope of the taxpayer’s 
business. 
210 De Koker Silke (op cit note 126) at 3.15 [2016, January 14]. Refer also to ITC 382 (1937) 9 SATC 
439 at 440: ‘So far as the question of isolated transactions is concerned, this has been settled by 
numerous decisions in the Supreme Court and in this Court [the Tax Court], and that if a profit 
arises out of trading it is taxable notwithstanding the fact that the transaction is an isolated one.’ 
211 CIR v Nussbaum (1996) (supra note 164) at 292. 
212 Pick n Pay (1992) (supra note 120) at 280. See also Broomberg (op cit note 138) at 71 where the 
author is of the view that the guideline set down in Californian Copper Syndicate (1904) (supra 
note 202), namely the operation of a business in carrying out a scheme of profit-making, presupposes 
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For the same reason, a taxpayer’s proceeds derived from the sale of an asset may still be 
regarded as income even where they are not carrying on a trade or business.213 Where a 
single transaction is involved, be it for an individual or a juristic person, it has been held to 
be more appropriate to simply consider whether there is a profit-making scheme.214 
 
                                                   
that the distinguishing factor in this guideline is the purpose to make a profit. Refer also to 6.3.3 
above. 
213 De Koker Silke (op cit note 126) at 3.15 [2016, January 14]. 
214 Natal Estates (1975) (supra note 149) at 198 and Elandsheuwel Farming (1978) (supra note 131) 
at 118 as cited by Smalberger JA in Pick n Pay (1992) (supra note 120) at 280. 
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CHAPTER 7 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
In this chapter, the necessary application and critical evaluation of the different arguments 
considered will be made, in order to conclude on the problem question of whether a taxpayer 
could treat gains realised on a derivatives hedge of a capital investment on capital account. 
7.1. Existing South African case law on derivatives hedging 
When considering the existing South African decisions regarding the taxation of gains made 
from derivative instruments and/or gains derived from the employment of hedging 
strategies, it becomes apparent that whilst some may assist in answering the question of 
whether a taxpayer can use a derivative to hedge against losses on an underlying share 
investment on capital account, none of them is necessarily conclusive. 
The taxpayer in ITC 43 (1925) was held to have made revenue gains hedging the cost of 
acquisition of trading stock for his produce trading business. The taxpayer’s flawed 
argument that these were fortuitous gambles was dismissed. The court’s decision was that 
the gains were realised as a result of his skill and business knowledge. 
Similarly, the taxpayer in ITC 340 (1935) was held to have made revenue gains hedging the 
foreign exchange difference on the cost of acquisition of trading stock from overseas. The 
court was of the view that the profit derived on these forward exchange contracts was part 
of the taxable profit derived from the business. 
The revenue conclusion in these decisions appears to have been reached on the basis that 
the derivatives in question were used in relation to the taxpayers’ businesses. To the extent 
that the decisions were based upon an assessment of the closeness of connection to the 
taxpayers’ profit-making activities they do not offer much assistance in addressing the 
problem question. While taxpayers’ could try to argue that the hedging of a share investment 
is capital in nature if the investment is not used as part of a ‘profit-making activity’, it should 
be acknowledged that these cases could be viewed as distinguishable on the facts to the 
extent that they both related to the hedging of an acquisition cost. The line of reasoning 
applied by the courts does not therefore bring us closer per se to an answer in the present 
instance (where the assets are already held). 
The taxpayer in ITC 1498 (1989) was, by contrast, determined to have made a capital gain 
hedging the foreign exchange risk associated with the cost of acquisition of a capital asset 
(to be used in his business) from overseas. This case is certainly more on point, and provides 
support for the notion that it is possible to hedge with a derivative on capital account. 
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The court in ITC 1498 (1989) held that the gains realised on the foreign exchange hedge of 
the taxpayer’s liability for capital expenditure should assume the character of this liability, 
on the basis that this is the ‘originating cause’ for the derivative entered into. It must be 
acknowledged however that this case could potentially also be distinguished on the facts 
from the matter at hand, on the basis that this too related to hedging the cost of acquisition 
of a capital asset (i.e. hedging the liability), as opposed to hedging a loss in value of a capital 
asset already held. It is submitted that whilst taxpayers should view this decision as 
conceptually supporting the idea of being able to hedge with a derivative on capital account, 
caution should be exercised in viewing this judgement as decisive were another court ever 
required to adjudicate the case where a taxpayer used a derivative to hedge against losses 
on an underlying share investment.215 
In ITC 1756 (1997) futures contracts were entered into by the taxpayer to hedge the cost of 
acquisition of an intended long-term share portfolio. To the extent that this case involved 
hedges relating to the acquisition of a share portfolio investment, as opposed to the 
acquisition of a capital asset for a business, it could have proved even more useful than 
ITC 1498 (1989) in answering the problem question. The issue of whether the profit on the 
hedge was capital or revenue in nature was unfortunately not one on which the court needed 
to pronounce judgement however. Moreover, the court indicated that had it been required 
to conclude on this, it would have been required to find against the taxpayer (i.e. to conclude 
that this was a revenue profit) on the basis that insufficient evidence was adduced by the 
taxpayer to prove that this was not a scheme of profit-making. This would then suggest a 
potential negative answer to the problem question, but as will be discussed further in 7.2.1 
below this case should, it is submitted, also not be taken as the definitive final word. 
In ITC 1223 (1974) the court found that the profit realised on the disposal of shares held for 
a short period of time was capital in nature because the shares had been disposed of in order 
to protect the taxpayer’s capital. Whilst this ‘mitigation of loss’ did realise a profit (and 
therefore derived precisely the same outcome as hedging with a derivative), and while this 
profit was held to be capital in nature because it wasn’t realised as part of a profit-making 
scheme, it wasn’t realised through a hedge of the shares with a derivative. 
Consequently, this decision could equally be distinguished on the facts from the problem 
question. It leaves open the issue of whether gains or losses realised hedging underlying 
shares held with a derivative (though achieving the same economic result as ITC 1223 
(1974), but through different means in order to avoid incurring the expense and opportunity 
costs of liquidating an entire investment) would (or should) be subject to different taxation. 
                                                   
215 As a Tax Court case, this decision is not binding on other courts and would only be of indicative 
value for a future court (and then only to the extent that it was faced with a similar set of facts). 
58 
7.2. The SARS view 
SARS puts forward the view in the Share Owners Guide that because futures contracts 
derive no return for the holder (such as dividends or interest), the sale of futures contracts 
should be taxed on revenue account. SARS contends that this should be the case even if used 
as a hedge against losses on underlying shares held as capital assets. 
In support of the view, SARS cites ITC 1756 (1997) and the English Court of Appeal decision 
in Wisdom v Chamberlain (Inspector of Taxes) (1969). It is, with respect, debateable 
whether these cases actually offer direct support for the stated position. 
7.2.1. Critique of reliance on ITC 1756 
The court in ITC 1756 (1997) was not required to make what it described as the ‘novel’ 
determination of the capital or revenue nature of the gains made on the sale of the futures 
contracts (a question which had up until that point not been considered in South African 
jurisprudence, and which has, hitherto, not come up for determination again). This was 
because the revenue authority had, in the matter in question, incorrectly attempted to 
include these gains which were made in March 1989 (i.e. which were received or accrued 
during the 1990 year of assessment) in the 1992 year of assessment. The court instead noted 
however that:216 
‘In order to determine that issue the court would have to consider the 
precise nature and operation of the ‘futures market’ as also the 
particular transactions entered into by the appellant. The evidence led 
in this matter as also the argument presented did not adequately place 
the court in a position to decide whether or not the gains in question 
resulted from a scheme of profit-making. Had the court been required to 
answer the question on its merits the court would have had no option but 
to find that the appellant had failed to discharge the onus which rests 
upon it of proving that the respondent was wrong in including the 
amount of R537 085 as part of appellant’s taxable income’. (own 
emphasis) 
It is submitted that the court did not explicitly state in its ratio decidendi, nor imply in an 
obiter dictum, that (as per the Share Owners Guide) a gain made by a taxpayer on ‘the sale 
of futures contracts is likely to be on revenue account, even if used as a hedge against losses 
on underlying shares held as capital assets’. The court merely pointed out, correctly it is 
respectfully submitted, that such a capital or revenue determination would require a precise 
                                                   
216 ITC 1756 (1997) (supra note 43) at 386. 
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examination of both the legal nature of futures contracts as well as the mechanics of their 
operation within the confines of the prescribed regulatory trading environment. The court 
also points out that an equally precise interrogation of the taxpayer’s intention, manifested 
as always in the transactions which are implemented, would need to be determined 
(presumably, in the accepted manner set out in our case law). The court’s statement merely 
shows that the Appellant in ITC 1756 (1997) had simply failed, in respect of the sale of the 
futures contracts, to lead sufficient evidence in respect of the above issues in order to 
discharge the evidentiary burden which it bore as the taxpayer and to allow the court to be 
able to adjudicate in its favour on the merits of the matter (had it been required to do so).217 
Moreover, the case in ITC 1756 (1997) dealt with the hedging of a long futures position 
adopted by a taxpayer looking to acquire an asset (but which it was, through no fault of its 
own, unable to purchase directly from the outset), so as to guarantee for itself the acquisition 
cost (purchase price) of that asset. This is different to, and can be distinguished from, the 
hedging by a taxpayer of the value of an investment already owned, as described in the Share 
Owners Guide, through the adopting of short futures positions to mitigate any risk of loss 
should the value of the investment decline. 
For these reasons, the reference to ITC 1756 (1997) as support for the stated view in the 
Share Owners Guide that the sale of all futures contracts is likely to be on revenue account, 
even if used as a hedge against losses on underlying shares held as capital assets, appears 
open to question.218 
7.2.2. Critique of reliance on Wisdom 
The Court of Appeal’s view that the transaction could not be classified as a pure investment, 
and therefore fell on the side of an adventure in the nature of trade, appears to be based 
upon the notion that this purchase of bullion ‘looked’ more like ‘an adventure in the nature 
of trade’ than an ‘investment’ because, inter alia, it: (i) produced no income; (ii) was only 
held for a short period of time; and (iii) was (while it lay in a vault) otherwise ‘useless’ to the 
taxpayer.219 
                                                   
217 It is submitted that, had further evidence been led before the court, it may well have been able to 
find in the taxpayer’s favour in this regard. The court’s tacit confirmation that the period for which a 
financial instrument is held is not decisive in determining its nature lends support to this view. 
218 Once again, it should also be remembered that this is a Tax Court case and as such other courts 
are, in the future, not bound to follow this decision as legal precedent. 
219 Refer to the ‘Business Income Manual’ No. 20260 on the HMRC website. Available: 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/bimmanual/BIM20260.html, [2014, November 9]. Refer also to 
the articles on http://www.taxationweb.co.uk/tax-articles/business-tax/the-badges-of-trade.html 
and http://www.tax.org.uk/tax-policy/tax-adviser-articles/2001/sales-of-assets-or-trading) which 
both classify Wisdom (1969) as a ‘motive’ case (i.e. the taxpayer’s ‘profit motive’ was decisive). 
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SARS’ inclusion of this case under the heading ‘Low or nil return’ in their discussion in the 
Share Owners Guide on how to determine a capital or revenue gain, appears to indicate that 
they have a similar feeling towards Single Stock Futures as the court in Wisdom (1969) had 
to silver ingots, when these are used as hedges. The question is however whether these 
principles are applicable. 
It is submitted that the principles in the Wisdom (1969) case may not necessarily be 
determinative for a South African taxpayer entering into futures contracts to hedge a capital 
share investment,220 for the following reasons: 
• While it is true that Single Stock Futures do not deliver a return in the same way that 
a share would do with its dividend yield, it is incorrect to propose that this 
characteristic is per se definitive in branding an asset as no longer capital in 
nature.221 
• It is also true that a Single Stock Future is not held for a long period of time, but this 
fact should not on its own be held to be decisive and should not be held up as the 
final word in any capital/revenue debate.222 It is a matter of degree.223 
• The fact that the taxpayer hedged Pound Sterling capital assets against devaluation 
using ingots of silver, which were unrelated to the underlying portfolio hedged, was 
a significant factor that contributed towards the court’s view that this was a trading 
adventure (i.e. a simple short-term acquisition with a view to a re-sale at a profit). 
This should be distinguished from a hedge of an underlying share position using 
Single Stock Futures, and Wisdom (1969) should not be seen as suitable authority 
for the view that such a hedge should also be seen to be revenue in nature. 
                                                   
220 It should also be remembered that as a case decided in the United Kingdom, the decision sets no 
binding precedent in South Africa. It can, at most, be used as a useful guidance or reference source 
by the courts in this country. 
221 Refer to the oft quoted dicta of Corbett JA in Elandsheuwel Farming (1978) (supra note 131) at 
118, where he explains that ‘the sale of an asset acquired with a view to holding it either in a non-
productive state or in order to derive income from the productive use thereof, and in fact so held, 
constitutes a realisation of fixed capital and the proceeds an accrual of a capital nature’ (own 
emphasis). 
222 LHC Corporation of SA (1950) (supra note 140) at 134; CIR v Richmond Estates (1956) (supra 
note 140) at 366. 
223 It should be remembered that the SAFEX imposes rules on persons entering into futures positions, 
which rules require that these position be closed out on a regular basis. Any disposal by the taxpayer 
is therefore not necessarily of his own volition, but is rather forced upon him because of his decision 
to acquire Single Stock Futures regulated by the SAFEX. 
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• There is precedent for South African taxpayers hedging inflation with Krugerrands 
(similar to the hedging in Wisdom (1969) of the devaluation of the Pound Sterling 
with silver ingots) on capital account.224 
• It is also, in the view of the author, misleading to say that Single Stock Futures 
entered into in order to hedge an underlying investment are ‘useless’ for the taxpayer 
because they offer no income yield or ‘pride of possession’.225 The Single Stock 
Futures serve a very obvious and ready purpose merely by being held, precisely 
because they allow the taxpayer to minimise financial loss in the event of a fall in the 
value of the underlying investment. 
Once again therefore, the authority cited as support for the stated view in the Share Owners 
Guide appears to be open to question. 
7.3. Determining the tax nature of the derivative hedge by analogy 
7.3.1. The derivative hedge is akin to an insurance contract 
Insurance proceeds compensate, make good or act as a ‘substitute’ for an insured loss. In 
the same way, the anticipated profit on the derivative hedge is intended to compensate, 
make good or act as a ‘substitute’ for the underlying value which is lost upon the devaluation 
of the share investment.226 
The income tax nature of the receipt on the derivative hedge may, so the argument goes, 
therefore be determined in an analogous manner to that of the insurance receipt – with 
reference to the function of this compensatory or ‘substituted’ amount. The essential 
question is whether the compensation was designed to fill a hole in the taxpayer’s profits, 
or whether it was intended to fill a hole in his assets.227 If the amount received in 
substitution fills a hole in profits, the payment is regarded as income. Where it fills a hole 
in the capital structure, the receipt is capital in nature. 
On the basis that the function of the substituted amount is to compensate for the anticipated 
decrease in the value of the share investment being hedged, as opposed to compensating for 
any anticipated loss of income (dividends) received from the investment, the compensation 
would be said to fill a hole in the taxpayer’s assets and be capital in nature. 
                                                   
224 Refer to CIR v Nel (1997) 59 SATC 349, where the taxpayer who had purchased Krugerrands as a 
hedge against inflation (and held them for a period of eleven years during which time they 
appreciated significantly in value), sold them in order to raise funds. The Court held that the coins 
were held on capital account and as such the profit on their sale was not subject to income tax. 
225 Such as one would have if one were to invest in an artwork or sculpture. 
226 Byala (op cit note 84) describes this as: ‘simply restoring a capital asset to its original value’. 
227 Burmah Steam Ship (1930) (supra note 65). 
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In certain instances it is also necessary to consider the actual nature of that which is lost, in 
the hands of the taxpayer in question, in order to determine whether the result obtained 
from applying the function test above remains determinative of the character of the 
compensatory or ‘substituted’ amount.228 Were the nature of the share investment to be 
stock-on-hand or floating capital for the taxpayer, then the nature of the substituted amount 
received would be revenue. However, to the extent that any hypothetical profit from its sale 
would not be revenue in nature (since it is not held as part of a profit-making scheme), then 
true nature of this share investment for the taxpayer is fixed, not floating, capital and the 
substituted amount received for its decrease in value remains a capital receipt. 
Byala (1993) sees the determination of whether the derivative hedging receipt is capital or 
revenue in nature as being dependent upon whether the proceeds received are designed to 
‘fill a hole in income or in capital’. Hutton (1998) similarly confirms that both the function 
of the substituted amount and the nature of that which is replaced need to be considered.229 
SAICA (1992) has also previously indicated that to the extent that proceeds from an 
insurance policy taken out to cover capital assets are not taxable, it is misleading to regard 
any profit derived from a hedging transaction as revenue in nature merely because it is taken 
out to cover downside risk.230 It is submitted that these statements further support the 
above position. 
There is therefore an argument, compelling in both its logic and the equitable result which 
it achieves, that the proceeds from the derivative hedge of a capital share investment may 
be treated as capital in nature. 
It is however important to note that no direct tax precedent exists for the position that a 
hedge is analogous to an insurance policy, and that ipso facto the tax treatment of these two 
should therefore be the same. A taxpayer seeking to rely on this insurance analogy 
argument, as the basis for a capital tax position adopted, should be mindful of this fact. 
It should also be noted that Brincker (2011) relegates the use of the insurance analogy to 
classify proceeds on a derivative hedge of a capital asset as capital in nature, given that an 
insurance pay out (for an insured capital asset) could be determined with reference to a loss 
of profits and would therefore still be revenue in nature, or that continuous hedges 
(notwithstanding that they were ostensibly linked to an underlying capital asset) could be 
seen as a profit-making scheme making the associated proceeds revenue in nature once 
more.231 
                                                   
228 Estate A G Bourke v CIR (1991) (supra note 67). 
229 Hutton (op cit note 86). 
230 SAICA (op cit note 1) at 4.4.3 on page 25. 
231 Brincker (op cit note 89). 
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7.3.2. The tax treatment of the derivative hedge should follow the tax 
treatment of the underlying 
Hutton (1998) argues that a gain made on a derivatives hedge should assume the character, 
for tax purposes, of the underlying asset or the exposed hedge. Applied in the present 
context, this argument is therefore that the tax treatment of the derivative hedge of the 
capital share investment should follow the (capital) tax treatment of the underlying shares. 
As support for this argument Hutton (1998) cites the same ITC 340 (1935) (where the 
taxpayer used FECs to hedge the acquisition of trading stock, and in so doing realised gains 
that were taxed as revenue), and ITC 1498 (1989) (where the taxpayer used FECs to hedge 
the foreign exchange risk on a debt incurred in acquiring a printing press in US Dollars), 
discussed in 7.1 above. 
As previously stated, ITC 1498 (1989) does offer support for the notion that it is possible to 
hedge with a derivative on capital account. Both ITC 340 (1935) and ITC 1498 (1989) 
however related to the hedging of a liability (the cost of acquisition) as opposed to the 
hedging of an asset already held. Applying Hutton’s (1998) argument, the gains realised 
from these derivative hedges could be said to have assumed their character from the 
‘exposed hedge’ as much as they did from the ‘underlying asset’. 
Brincker (2011) also supports the argument that in order to determine the character of the 
proceeds realised from a derivative hedging transaction one should focus on the nature of 
the underlying asset. He is however also cautious to place too much reliance on ITC 340 
(1935) or ITC 1498 (1989). In his view, the fact that the taxpayer in ITC 340 (1935) had a 
separate profit motive gave rise to the revenue treatment of the gains realised in respect of 
the derivative hedge, and the court in ITC 1498 (1989) only found the gains to be capital in 
nature because the FECs were not seen as integral to the taxpayer’s business. This suggests 
that neither of these decisions were definitively reached, in his view, purely because of the 
revenue or capital nature of the assets underlying the hedges. 
For Brincker (2011), the real test is whether the taxpayer has a true capital intention with 
both the derivative hedge and the underlying asset. On the basis that the taxpayer could 
discharge the burden of proof in this regard (through evidencing, for example, a sufficiently 
close link between the hedge and the underlying, the extent to which the hedge mitigates 
the risk perceived and the duration for which the derivative hedge is entered into) it could 
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be possible to successfully treat the proceeds of a derivative hedge of a capital share portfolio 
as capital in nature.232 
If regard is had to the above case law, and the commentary on this argument, it is once again 
noted that no definitive tax precedent exists for adopting a capital position in respect of a 
derivative hedge of an underlying asset held, based solely on its capital nature. Similarly, 
there is no precedent for what is required to be shown in order to discharge the burden of 
proof of showing a ‘true capital intention’ with the derivative hedge. Taxpayers may 
therefore again need to exercise circumspection if seeking to rely on this argument. 
In the absence of definitive precedent in South Africa, support may however be found in the 
United Kingdom where an ancillary futures hedge (provided it appropriately eliminates 
risk) is taxed on the basis of the tax treatment of the underlying transaction. This specifically 
includes the situation where index futures are used to protect the value of an investment 
against a fall in the market. Gains on the derivative hedge will in this instance be taxed on 
capital account.233 
Hutton (1998) and Brincker (2011) do both also motivate this argument for analogous tax 
treatment on the basis of the economic merit of linking the tax treatment of the underlying 
capital investment and the hedging instrument. To do otherwise would, in their view, distort 
the efficacy of the hedge. This is a compelling submission, in both its logic and the equitable 
result which it achieves, which should be borne in mind by taxpayers seeking to adopt a 
capital position in respect of a derivative hedge based on the capital nature of the underlying 
assets. 
7.4. Common law ‘First Principles’ 
7.4.1. The taxpayer’s intention and circumstantial indicators of 
intention 
7.4.1.1. Intention 
Judicial precedent sets out that the taxpayer’s subjective intention upon acquisition of an 
asset is the most important factor in the determination of the capital or revenue nature of 
any receipt from its disposal. The taxpayer’s own ipse dixit should not however necessarily 
be accepted as the final word, as any stated subjective intention may be designed to serve 
                                                   
232 This ‘intention’ requirement is supported by other authors too. SAICA looks for ‘a sufficiently close 
link between the underlying capital investment and the hedging instrument’; Byala and Hutton 
require a ‘genuine hedging intention’ and Coetsee ‘refers to an intention to protect’. 
233 The US Tax Code and case law, and Australian tax rulings, are less helpful (with the US precedent 
only dealing with the taxation of revenue hedges on the basis of the underlying, and with the 
Australian ruling being directly aimed at commodities hedges). 
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self-interest. This stated intention must therefore also be tested against objectively 
determinable facts. 
Moreover, any stated capital intention on the part of the taxpayer must be evaluated to 
determine whether a scheme of profit-making was in fact being pursued with the asset in 
question. 
Notwithstanding an ostensible subjective capital intention being present on the acquisition 
of the derivative used as a hedge, the taxpayer in question may on the basis of what follows 
still be held to realise revenue gains on its disposal. 
7.4.1.2. Circumstantial indicators 
It is possible to argue that gains realised on a derivative hedge should be treated as revenue 
in nature, based on two circumstantial indicators of the taxpayer’s intention – the fact that 
no return (interest or dividends) is derived in respect of these derivative instruments, and 
the relatively short three month nature of the holding of the derivative instruments (which 
is known at inception). The existence of these factors appears to be favoured by SARS in 
concluding that a derivative hedge should always be taxed on revenue account. 
It is accepted however in our jurisprudence (and on certain occasions even by SARS) that 
these factors remain mere ‘indicators’ that support or refute a taxpayer’s stated intention. 
They are not decisive tests. 
Furthermore, the Appellate Division has confirmed that the holding of an asset with a 
capital intention can include holding it in a non-productive state (as would be the case for 
any derivative instrument acquired) and not just in order to derive income therefrom.234 
It should also be remembered that the fact that the derivative is not held ‘for keeps’ and that 
it is disposed of within three months of its acquisition is as a consequence of the JSE 
requirement that derivatives traded on the SAFEX be closed out every quarter. The disposal 
is not therefore as a result of the taxpayer’s choice. Brincker (2011) states that ‘the period of 
holding a derivative is not necessarily decisive to determine the nature of the proceeds 
upon its subsequent disposal’. Even though derivatives are only held for short period time, 
they are often repeatedly ‘rolled over’ in order to hedge for a longer desired period. Brincker 
(2011) suggests that the proceeds realised from such successive derivative transactions 
should not be seen to be of a revenue nature merely ‘because a taxpayer cannot afford an 
                                                   
234 Elandsheuwel Farming (1978) (supra note 131). 
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expensive hedge for a longer term period, … as the intention is always to run over 
derivatives on a continuous basis’.235 
It is submitted as correct therefore that neither the lack of a return, nor the length of the 
holding period, should be seen to be decisive when determining the income tax nature of a 
derivatives hedge. 
7.4.2. Scheme of profit-making and the taxpayer’s purpose 
7.4.2.1. Scheme of profit-making 
If the derivative is acquired with the outright intention of selling to make a profit, then the 
taxpayer’s subjective intention is once again determinative and the proceeds are revenue in 
nature. Where the derivative is acquired to be held as a capital asset, but then subsequently 
dealt with and disposed of in pursuance of a profit (a so called ‘change of intention’), the 
proceeds can still be seen to be revenue in nature. The taxpayer is described in these 
instances as pursuing a scheme of profit-making. 
The most compelling argument as to why the gains or losses realised on the disposal of the 
derivative, entered into as a hedge, should be classified as revenue in nature is based on the 
fact that the derivative is acquired with the intention to dispose of it at a ‘profit’, if the hedge 
has been correctly entered into. The taxpayer’s actions (in hedging with the derivative) 
therefore constitute, so the argument goes, a scheme of profit-making.236 
In the present instance the hypothetical taxpayer in question will be said to have pursued a 
scheme of profit-making (either from the outset or subsequent to a change of intention) 
where the gain (profit) realised on the derivative hedge is not seen to be ‘fortuitous’, but 
rather ‘designedly sought for and worked for’. This in turn requires a further subjective 
assessment of what the taxpayer’s purpose (or potentially his dominant purpose) was, and 
whether it may be said that this purpose was to make a profit. 
7.4.2.2. The impact of the taxpayer’s ‘purpose’ 
A taxpayer’s intention on acquiring an asset might also be described as his plan for the 
asset.237 This plan in turn may be said to be aimed at achieving his purpose, which would be 
the reason behind his intention. 
                                                   
235 Brincker (op cit note 89). 
236 SAICA (op cit note 1) also confirms this: ‘since a hedger’s intention is to prevent a loss by entering 
into an instrument with an equal but opposite position, this is (on a strict interpretation of present 
case law) nothing short of a scheme of profit-making which may lead one to conclude that all 
futures or option transactions will be revenue in nature’. 
237 Being the ‘plan’ which he has formulated through the application of his mind to the attainment of 
his goal. 
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In the present instance the taxpayer in question acquires the derivative as a hedge for an 
underlying share investment. Whilst viewing this in isolation may suggest he acquires the 
derivative with the intention of disposing of it at a profit, it is submitted that this should not 
be viewed as an isolated transaction precisely because this is a hedge of an underlying 
position. A hedge of this sort does not take place in isolation. It could, it is submitted, 
therefore be said that his intention (plan) upon acquisition is to utilise the derivative as a 
hedge, for the purpose (reason) of mitigating downside loss on the underlying equity 
investment. To the extent that his purpose (reason) for acting was ostensibly not to make a 
profit from the disposal of the derivative but rather to mitigate against downside loss on the 
underlying shares, such profit could potentially be described as fortuitous and not 
something ‘designedly sought for and worked for’. The taxpayer is trying to reduce the 
diminution of his or her estate, as opposed to trying to grow his or her patrimony further. 
Any profits realised on the hedging position are merely a means to an end, and not per se 
the end in and of themselves. Acceptance of this argument would mean that the taxpayer 
would not be said to have pursued a scheme of profit-making. The resultant gains or losses 
on the disposal of the derivative would then be capital in nature. 
Where however the efficacy of the taxpayer’s hedging strategy depends directly upon his or 
her ability to make a profit on the disposal of the derivative selected, it is acknowledged that 
it could be difficult to successfully argue that such profit was not ‘designedly sought for and 
worked for’. This creates the situation where it would likely be said that the taxpayer has 
more than one intention, and more than one purpose, in acquiring the derivative (i.e. a 
hedging intention for the purpose of mitigating loss, and a disposal intention for the purpose 
of realising a profit). 
In order to determine therefore whether this should constitute a scheme of profit-making, 
taxed on revenue account, it must be determined whether the profit purpose identified was 
his ‘dominant purpose’. A ‘dominant purpose’ has been described as the one to which all 
other alternatives are entirely secondary, and, though contemplated, do not materially 
persuade the taxpayer to act. This description of a ‘dominant purpose’ creates the 
impression that a taxpayer could entertain and foresee the possibility of making a profit 
(and reconcile him-/herself with this reality) without per se being viewed as having the 
dominant purpose of making a profit. It is submitted however that taxpayers should 
recognise the difficulties that can arise when it comes to proving that there is no scheme of 
profit-making where they have more than one co-existing purpose, and one of them is 
calculated at yielding a profit. 
Notwithstanding this, our courts have however previously relied upon a taxpayer’s co-
existing purpose as grounds for the determination of the capital nature of the proceeds on 
the disposal of an asset, even though the taxpayer also had a profit-making purpose (i.e. the 
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taxpayer acquired an asset with the intention of disposing of it to best advantage).238 More 
recently, our jurisprudence has been expanded in this regard to the extent that a taxpayer 
who acquires an asset with the intention of disposing of it (i.e. has a profit-making purpose) 
may only rely on this ‘co-existing purpose’ argument (in order to found a claim that the 
proceeds derived are still capital in nature) if there is a real justification for the acquisition 
and disposal of the asset other than the pure realisation of that asset.239 Where such a real 
justification exists, the realisation of the asset will not be treated as the taxpayer’s dominant 
purpose. In this instance, it is submitted that the other, co-existing purpose will be 
considered to be dominant and will allow for the proceeds derived from the disposal to be 
classified accordingly. 
In the present case it is submitted that such a real justification for the acquisition and 
disposal of the derivative in question, other than pure realisation at a profit, could arguably 
be found in the hedging purpose for which the derivative is acquired. The derivative is 
acquired to mitigate downside loss on the underlying equity investment, without incurring 
the expense and opportunity costs of liquidating the entire investment or where the 
taxpayer is contractually precluded from selling the underlying investment. This hedging 
purpose would then be dominant, and would mean that the taxpayer would not be said to 
have pursued a scheme of profit-making with the derivative. The resultant gains on the 
disposal of the derivative would then be capital in nature. 
SAICA (1992) confirmed that the application of well-established legal principles to 
investment strategies that utilise derivative instruments could lead to all resultant profits 
being treated as revenue in nature. The report also confirmed that this could lead to 
inequitable results, and stated that the tax treatment of the profit from the hedge should not 
be done with reference to intention but that instead the motive test should prevail.240 It is 
submitted that referring to a taxpayer’s dominant, hedging purpose with the acquisition 
and disposal of the derivative in order to characterise the nature of the proceeds received 
could result in a more equitable application of the taxation laws, as opposed to the result 
obtained solely concentrating on intention. Making reference to the taxpayer’s purpose in 
this way would also align closely with the existing determination of whether the taxpayer 
has entered into a scheme of profit-making (which also requires an evaluation of purpose). 
                                                   
238 See Berea West Estates (1976) (supra note 167) and the decision that the purpose of the 
realisation company in question was to facilitate the realisation of the property to best advantage on 
behalf of the beneficiaries, and to ensure the exclusive distribution of the proceeds amongst such 
beneficiaries. To this end the profit was held to be capital in nature. 
239 See Founders Hill (1972) (supra note 172). 
240 SAICA (op cit note 1 at 24-25). 
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7.4.3. General guidelines 
7.4.3.1. Originating cause 
If the steps which the taxpayer takes in order to receive an amount are considered to be 
‘revenue’ in nature, then the amount received will similarly be revenue in nature. Where 
these steps constitute the conducting of a business or an enterprise, or some other form of 
‘work’ (in the sense of the active application of the taxpayer’s own physical or mental efforts 
or the application of his or her capital to earn income), the revenue character of these efforts 
will result in their product also being treated as revenue. 
To the extent that the taxpayer hedging a capital share investment with a derivative is not 
however conducting a business or an enterprise, it is submitted that this guideline will only 
indicate a revenue result where the originating cause for the receipt from the disposal of the 
derivative can be said to be the taxpayer’s ‘work’ (using his wits and/or capital) performed 
to earn the receipt. 
Whilst it is by no means certain that this would be the case, conceptually the taxpayer’s 
correct identification and acquisition of an appropriate derivative to act as a hedge could be 
said to be the result of the application of his wits and skill, which could potentially constitute 
the ‘work’ performed to earn the receipt. 
7.4.3.2. Capital productively employed 
The focus of this guideline in determining the tax nature of an amount received is on 
whether such amount was derived from the (productive) utilisation of the capital of the 
taxpayer. This productive utilisation constitutes either the provision of the use of this capital 
to another in exchange for a return, or through the use of this capital to acquire an asset that 
derives a return. The application of this guideline does not however extend to the 
classification of an amount derived from the disposal of an asset acquired with the 
taxpayer’s capital. Where the capital of the taxpayer is used to acquire a derivative which 
results in a profit on its disposal (i.e. where the hedge is successful), such profit is not as a 
result of the productive employment of capital. This guideline does not therefore appear to 
be of assistance in classifying the revenue or capital nature of a gain realised on a derivatives 
hedge. 
7.4.3.3. ‘Fruit’ vs ‘tree’ analogy 
This ‘fruit’ and ‘tree’ metaphor is an application of the ‘capital productively employed’ 
guideline above. In this application, the focus is on whether the amount received constitutes 
a return on an asset held, as opposed to an amount received from the disposal of the asset 
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itself. Since any gain derived on a successful hedge would result from the disposal of the 
derivative,241 this guideline also appears to not be of assistance in classifying the revenue or 
capital nature of such a gain realised. 
7.4.3.4. ‘Fixed’ vs ‘floating’ capital 
This guideline determines the nature of a receipt from the disposal of an asset by making 
reference to the nature of the asset itself. A relatively permanent asset that is not consumed 
through the carrying on of a trade or business (so called fixed capital) would give rise to a 
capital receipt upon disposal. The disposal of an asset that is consumed in the carrying on 
of a trade or business (so called floating capital) would give rise to a revenue receipt. While 
this guideline seeks to classify the tax nature of a receipt derived from the disposal of an 
asset, which could theoretically apply to an amount received on the disposal of a derivative, 
it is submitted that this guideline is only relevant where a taxpayer is engaged in the 
operation of a trade or a business. The courts have previously indicated that where no trade 
is conducted there cannot be ‘floating capital’. This guideline does not therefore appear to 
be of assistance in classifying the revenue or capital nature of a gain realised on a derivative 
outside of the operation of a business. 
7.4.3.5. Operation of a business 
In essence, this guideline requires a two-fold consideration – whether there is the operation 
of business, and if so whether it is a scheme for profit-making. Any amounts received in 
respect thereof would be revenue in nature. 
It is submitted that in the ordinary course, one would not expect hedging activities 
conducted with derivatives to always constitute a ‘business’. However, a business could 
ostensibly entail ‘anything which occupies the time and attention of a man for the purpose 
of profit’. Theoretically therefore, a series of hedging transactions entered into by an 
individual taxpayer could constitute the carrying on of a ‘business’ provided an element of 
continuity was present and the transactions performed were ones regularly and continually 
carried out in the operation of that business. Such an individual who, for example, regularly 
entered into multiple Single Stock Futures short positions contemporaneously, in respect 
of different shares within the investment portfolio in order to mitigate the downside risk on 
all of these shares because they are all in the same market sector and subject to the same 
risks, could be construed as operating a ‘business’. 
                                                   
241 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that this gain on ‘disposal’ is paid ‘early’ through 
the daily variation margin payments received on a ‘short’ derivative position that is ‘in the money’. 
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More importantly perhaps, even where a business is being conducted, this guideline 
necessitates consideration of the subjective element of whether (on the facts) the taxpayer 
has carried out that business with the requisite profit motive. Similarly, where a single 
transaction is involved, be it for an individual or a juristic person, it has been held to be 
more appropriate to simply consider whether there is a profit-making scheme. 
The usefulness of this guideline as a separate determinative test is therefore questionable, 
since it in essence requires consideration of the same principal issues as 7.4.2 above. 
7.5. Conclusion on arguments and proposed capital treatment 
When one considers South African precedent to determine the income tax treatment of 
derivative instrument hedging strategies, no definitive answers emerge. The decisions have 
fallen on both sides of the revenue and capital divide. Gains have been found to be revenue 
in nature, but on the basis of the business conducted by the taxpayer. Gains have been found 
to be capital in nature, but in instances where the hedge was of the acquisition cost of an 
asset (as opposed to a hedge of the value of an asset already held). Gains realised to prevent 
a loss in value of an investment have been held to be capital in nature because no profit-
making scheme was implemented, but no derivatives were used in this ‘hedging’ strategy. 
These decisions are therefore all distinguishable on the facts from the question at hand. 
SARS puts forward the view that the sale of futures contracts should be taxed on revenue 
account even if used as a hedge against losses on underlying shares held as capital assets. 
The authority cited for this statement does not however support this conclusion, to the 
extent that the relevant courts did not actually make this finding. 
In the opinion of the writer a compelling (and equitable) argument for the treatment of a 
derivatives hedge of a capital share investment can be made based on the analogy that the 
anticipated profit on the derivative hedge is intended to compensate for the underlying 
value which is lost, in the same way that insurance proceeds compensate for an insured loss. 
Where this loss is capital in nature, so is the compensation. It is however important to note 
that no direct tax precedent exists for this position, and commentators differ in their views 
in this regard. 
An equally compelling argument may be made that the treatment of the derivative hedge 
should follow the nature of the underlying asset or transaction. Whilst case law can be 
pointed to in support of this theory, the cases cited are again potentially distinguishable in 
that they relate to the hedging of an acquisition cost for an asset, as opposed to the hedging 
of the value of an asset already held. While this approach would also appear to elicit support 
from commentators (and to align with the treatment in to the United Kingdom), it should 
again be noted that no direct tax precedent exists for this position either. 
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A taxpayer’s ostensible subjective capital intention upon the acquisition of an asset (while 
being the most important factor in determining the nature of any receipt from its disposal) 
cannot be accepted as definitive. Similarly, circumstantial indicators of this intention – in 
the form of no derived return on the derivative instrument and the short holding period 
prior to its disposal – should not be seen to be decisive. 
The most compelling argument as to why the gains realised on the disposal of the derivative, 
entered into as a hedge, should be classified as revenue in nature is based on the fact that 
the derivative is acquired with the intention to dispose of it at a ‘profit’, if the hedge has been 
correctly entered into. In other words, this is a scheme of profit-making. 
However, to the extent that the taxpayer’s purpose (reason) is to mitigate downside loss on 
the underlying equity investment, any profit could potentially be described as fortuitous and 
not something ‘designedly sought for and worked for’ and therefore capital in nature. 
Alternatively, it could be said that the taxpayer has more than one intention, and more than 
one purpose, in acquiring the derivative (i.e. a hedging intention for the purpose of 
mitigating loss, and a disposal intention for the purpose of realising a profit). With such a 
dual purpose, it is necessary that a ‘real justification’ for the acquisition and disposal of the 
derivative be found. It is submitted that the hedging purpose would meet this requirement, 
and that the taxpayer should not be said to have pursued a scheme of profit-making. Any 
resultant gains would be capital in nature. It is further submitted that referring to a 
taxpayer’s dominant, hedging purpose in this manner in order to characterise the nature of 
the proceeds received would result in a more equitable application of the taxation laws, and 
that in the circumstances this is the preferred argument to be followed. 
For the sake of completeness, none of the further common law guidelines reviewed appear 
to be of assistance in classifying the revenue or capital nature of a gain realised in the 
circumstances in question. 
There are also, in addition to the above, compelling economic justifications for a proposed 
capital treatment of any such receipts and accruals, which are set out below. 
7.6. Economic considerations motivating for capital treatment 
Whilst it has been said for many years that ‘there is no equity about tax’,242 there are also 
compelling economic motivations for why the capital nature treatment proposed for gains 
realised on a derivatives hedge should be accepted as being correct.243 
                                                   
242 Lord Cairns in Partington v Attorney General (1869) LR 4 HL 100. 
243 As discussed above, there is economic merit in linking the tax treatment of the underlying capital 
investment and the hedging instrument. To do otherwise distorts the efficacy of the hedge. 
73 
Consider in this regard the following calculations in Table 1 below, for two different 
scenarios which are further explained hereafter: 
Scenario 1: Sale of shares  
Disposal of shares @ R15,000  
Proceeds R15,000 
Base Cost R5,000 
Gain R10,000 
Disposal of shares @ R25,000  
Proceeds R25,000 
Base Cost R10,000 
Gain R15,000 
  
Scenario 2: Derivatives Hedge  
Futures contract entered into @ contract price of R15,000  
Proceeds R5,000 
Base Cost R0 
Gain R5,000 
Disposal of shares @ R25,000  
Proceeds R25,000 
Base Cost R5,000 
Gain R20,000 
Table 1: Comparison of capital gains derived from alternative strategies 
In scenario 1, a taxpayer who acquired a share investment with an ostensible capital 
intention for a cost of R5 000, who anticipated a decrease in the market value of that 
investment after seeing growth to a market value of R15 000, decided to sell the shares 
accordingly in order to avoid losing their value accretion to date. The gain realised on this 
profit taking would likely be capital in nature. Moreover, if the same share investment had 
been held for more than three years the gain realised would be deemed to be capital in 
nature and all debate over the intention of the taxpayer would be removed.244 
If that same taxpayer was to then in the future re-enter the market after the anticipated drop 
in the share price and purchase an equivalent quantity of those same shares at their new 
market value of R10 000,245 his CGT base cost for those shares would be R10 000 going 
forward. 
At this point, the taxpayer’s position would be as follows: 
                                                   
244 Refer to section 9C of the Act, which provides that any amount (other than a dividend) received 
in respect of a ‘qualifying share’ (defined essentially as an equity share held for three or more years) 
shall be deemed to be capital in nature. 
245 For present purposes it may be assumed that the taxpayer once again has an ostensible capital 
intention and that he can sufficiently prove that he has not begun trading in these stocks. 
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• He would have realised a capital gain of R10 000 (R15 000 proceeds realised on 
the sale of the shares at their market value less the original base cost of R5 000). 
• He would still hold the same quantity of shares in the company as he did previously, 
however with a new base cost of R10 000 going forward. 
Contrast this with scenario 2 where the same taxpayer did not sell the shares in question 
due to, for example, illiquidity of the shares in the market, the costs involved in selling or 
simply because he believed in the ability of the share price to recover and did not therefore 
wish to disinvest from the stock long term, but instead entered into a derivatives position 
(e.g. a futures contract to sell the shares for their current share price of R15 000 at some 
point in the future) in order to hedge/protect the same value accretion in his underlying 
capital investment against the price drop which he anticipates will materialise. If he then 
simply closes out this position (without delivering the underlying shares to the 
counterparty) after the share price drops to R10 000 as anticipated, his position would be 
as follows: 
• He would have realised a gain of R5 000 in the form of the variation margin 
received on the futures contract (R5 000 proceeds realised less the original base cost 
of R0). 
• He would still hold the same quantity of shares in the company as he did previously, 
however still with their original base cost of R5 000 going forward. 
The taxpayer has therefore realised a smaller capital gain through the use of the derivatives 
hedge in scenario 2 (R5 000 as opposed to R10 000 on the sale of the shares in scenario 1), 
but has not received a step up in his base cost for the share investment which he holds (base 
cost remains the original R5 000, as opposed to having increased to R10 000 as in 
scenario 1). 
If he was to therefore sell the shares several years later for their market value of R25 000 at 
that time, he would realise in scenario 1 a second capital gain of R15 000 (R25 000 
proceeds realised on the sale of the shares at their market value less the increased base cost 
of R10 000). In scenario 2 he would realise a larger capital gain of R20 000 (R25 000 
proceeds realised on the sale of the shares at their market value less the original base cost 
of R5 000). 
The taxpayer would therefore realise capital gains of R10 000 and R15 000 respectively on 
the disposal of shares in scenario 1, whilst in scenario 2 there would be a R5 000 gain on the 
derivatives hedge and a subsequent R20 000 gain on the disposal of the shares. Importantly 
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however the total capital gains realised by the taxpayer would – in both scenarios – be the 
same (R25 000). This is an equitable result, for both the taxpayer and the Commissioner. 
With this in mind, it would be palpably inequitable if the taxpayer in scenario 2 was to be 
taxed on the gain realised on the derivatives hedge on income account. Not only would this 
result in tax being paid at a higher rate, but as is seen above there is also no step up in base 
cost for the shares held in scenario 2 which would mean that the taxpayer would (upon an 
eventual sale of the shares in the future at R25 000) pay both income tax and capital gains 
tax on the same growth in value. 
It is submitted that this inequality should not arise if one pursues the same purpose 
(protecting the growth to date in the value of the shares held), but achieves it in a different 
manner (through the use of a derivatives hedge, as opposed to simply selling the underlying 
shares). 
In addition to the above, if the gains on the derivative were taxed on income account and if 
the price of the underlying share fell far enough that the taxpayer then took a further 
decision to dispose of the shares as well within the same year of assessment, any capital loss 
realised on the disposal of the shares could not be used to offset the revenue gain realised 
on the derivative. 
If gains and losses realised on the derivative and the underlying shares respectively could 
not theoretically be offset against one another, it would make the hedge tax inefficient.246 
The fact that the capital treatment of gains realised on the derivatives hedge creates an 
economically fair result in the circumstances should therefore be seen to further weigh in 
favour of any proposed capital treatment of such amounts for tax purposes. 
 
                                                   
246 Refer to the comments of Hutton to this effect (op cit note 86 at fn 16 on page 168). 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
8.1. Problem question addressed 
This study set out to consider whether it is possible to hedge with a derivative on capital 
account, and for the gains realised on a derivatives hedge to be taxed as capital as opposed 
to revenue. 
In order to address this question, the various arguments for the capital or revenue treatment 
of such receipts or accruals were considered against the background of a sale of futures 
contracts used as a hedge against losses on an underlying share investment held as a capital 
asset. 
8.2. Conclusion on arguments 
This study found that existing judicial precedent did not assist directly in answering the 
problem question (either positively or negatively), as it was distinguishable on the facts from 
the scenario at hand. The SARS argument which suggested that the problem question 
should be answered in the negative was however also refutable for lack of authority. 
While compelling analogous insurance and underlying asset arguments could be found to 
answer the problem question positively, no direct tax precedent existed to support these 
either. Commentators' views also differed in this regard. It was found that the most 
compelling arguments for both a positive and a negative answer to the problem question 
are derived from common law first principles. Where emphasis is placed on the taxpayer’s 
intention, the possibility exists that a scheme of profit-making could be said to exist which 
requires a negative answer to the problem question. It is submitted however that the more 
appropriate test is to emphasise the taxpayer’s hedging purpose (or motive) over intention. 
Doing so allows for a positive answer to the problem question – the gains realised on a 
derivatives hedge of an underlying capital investment can and should be taxed on capital 
account. 
8.3. Further proposed research 
Areas for future research that could be considered would include the treatment of losses 
realised on the same derivatives hedges considered here, which should theoretically be 
treated in the same way – taxpayer’s should not seek to have gains taxed on capital account 
whilst simultaneously trying to treat losses realised as revenue deductions. It could also be 
considered to include in such future research an analysis of the CGT treatment for the 
taxpayer on the ultimate disposal of the underlying share investment after having realised 
a loss on the hedge, to consider how this capital loss (potentially carried forward and offset 
77 
against the gain realised in a future year of assessment) economically plays out for both the 
taxpayer and the fiscus. 
An investigation into the capital or revenue nature of gains or losses realised through the 
use of option contracts to hedge capital investments could also be considered, taking into 
account that options have legislative provisions in the Act which would need to be 
considered. 
The use of index futures to hedge an underlying share portfolio, as opposed to Single Stock 
Futures hedging a particular share held, and a consideration of whether the same (or other) 
arguments for capital treatment could be made would be particularly useful. This could be 
expanded to differentiate between index futures used to hedge portfolios that comprise the 
same basket of equities, and the hedging of portfolios whose composition differs from that 
of the index used. 
The extent to which the above arguments achieve the same, or differing, results when 
applied to derivatives hedges utilised by a collective investment scheme fund manager, as 
part of the manager’s business, could also be considered. 
Consideration could also be given to the results that would be obtained if the arguments put 
forward in this study, in particular those relating to common law first principles, were 
applied to determine the capital or revenue nature of gains or losses realised by speculators 
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